Schulich School of Law, Dalhousie University

Schulich Law Scholars
LLM Theses

Theses and Dissertations

10-2018

Language's Empire: A Counter-Telling of Administrative Law in
Canada
Nicholas Hooper
Dalhousie University - Dalhousie University, Schulich School of Law, Students, w.n.c.hooper@gmail.com

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.schulichlaw.dal.ca/llm_theses
Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Jurisprudence Commons, Law and Philosophy Commons,
Law and Society Commons, and the Public Law and Legal Theory Commons

Recommended Citation
Nick Hooper, Language's Empire: A Counter-Telling of Administrative Law in Canada (LLM Thesis,
Dalhousie University, Schulich School of Law, 2018) [Unpublished].

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses and Dissertations at Schulich Law Scholars. It
has been accepted for inclusion in LLM Theses by an authorized administrator of Schulich Law Scholars. For more
information, please contact hannah.steeves@dal.ca.

LANGUAGE’S EMPIRE
A Counter-Telling of Administrative Law in Canada

by

Nick Hooper

Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements
for the degree of Master of Laws
at
Dalhousie University
Halifax, Nova Scotia
August 2018

© Copyright by Nick Hooper, 2018

Table of Contents
Abstract

iii

Chapter 1: Introduction

1

Chapter 2: A Principled Landscape & Its Discontents

6

(a.) At Play in the Field of Language

8

(b.) Toward an Interpretive Claim Space

26

(c.) The External Skeptic, Internalized

38

(d.) Interpretation as Power

47

Chapter 3: Stories of Interpretation

49

(a.) Deferring to Respect

52

(b.) Beyond the Courtroom

71

(c.) Naming Constituent Elements

86

Chapter 4: The Metaphysics of Administrative Law

93

(a.) Finding Objective Meaning

95

(b.) Throwing Voices

110

(c.) The Only Reasonable Answer

116

Chapter 5: On the Continued Necessity of Statutory Interpretation

126

(a.) Belief in Doubt

124

(b.) Candid Bureaucracy

134

(c.) Interpretive Poetics

140

Chapter 6: Conclusion

148

Bibliography

150

Appendix A: Case Sample Methodology & List

160

ii

Abstract
This thesis renders the unstated assumptions that animate statutory interpretation
in the administrative state. It argues that the current approach is a disingenuous rhetorical
overlay that masks the politics of definitional meaning. After rejecting the possibility of
structuring principles in our (post)modern oversaturation of signs, the thesis concludes
with an aspirational account of interpretive pragmatism in the face of uncertainty.

iii

I. Introduction
In a system of written laws, interpretation necessarily precedes governance. Legal
texts do not exist outside the act of reading them. Language and the subject are
inseparable. While these propositions are largely uncontroversial—merely denoting a
preliminary step of reading the text prior to further action—they create a significant,
unresolved problem for legal interpretation: How does the isolated act of construing a text
give way to a democratic community ruled by predefined laws? The answers provided in
our jurisprudence exist in tension with the theory they ignore. As contemporary
understandings of language continue to demonstrate the inherently personal—and,
indeed, arguably incommunicable—nature of textual interpretation, the law has
recommitted itself to images of objectivity and universality. This is both unfortunate and
understandable. State power must justify itself and, on most accounts, should aspire to
something more than the ascension of the sociolegal elite at the expense of all others.
These aspirations, however compelling, quickly run up against the limits of texts, broadly
construed. If we begin with the uncontestable notion that language is constructed and
words defy any inherent content, it becomes difficult to dispute the impossibility of a
verifiable truth embodied in laws. There is at least some play in the structure of legal
interpretation—an idea fundamentally at odds with the discoverability of textual
meaning.
However abstracted the foregoing paragraph may appear, this core tension of
legal interpretation is rehearsed everyday. In its most familiar form, a dispute about
statutory language reaches a legal decision-maker for resolution. If the language that
constitutes the relevant provision has no embedded meaning, then how are the competing
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interpretations collapsed into an authoritative definition? This implicates the relationship
between the decision-maker and the textual stimulus, begging the question of how much
constraint is imposed by the provision at issue. Words have no inherent meaning, but
there appears to be an intuitive range prompted by familiar signs. A “book” probably
denotes a bound collection of pages, and might also suggest an electronic device, but
surprise and criticism would result if, say, a motor vehicle was included in the legal
definition. There is no necessary content in language, but conventional usage facilitates
routine interactions and even the appearance of communicative congress. Perhaps, then,
when a meaningless, constructed term is defined by an unaccountable judge, she is
simply standing as a proxy for the common understanding of it. The law in this area is,
after all, deeply committed to the “ordinary and grammatical sense” of a provision.1
This comforting image begins to break down when one considers the source
material with which we work. When meaning is in dispute, a legal decision-maker
defines a provision in a textual decision. She uses words to define language. There is
infinite regress; we are without a reference point, as every subsequent definition begs
another. While the problems of communication in a world of contingent sign associations
are multifaceted and situational, the practice of legal interpretation provides a uniquely
clear means of tracing the interrelations between language and authority. Here, state
actors impose meaning on that which cannot be verified. Definitional sense arises, as I
will argue, from individualized experiences and psycholinguistic biases; it is therefore
important to engage with the question of who gives meaning to the arbitrary signs that
constitute our language. In other words, when a written law must be defined—and then
1

The current approach to statutory interpretation in Canada is set-out in Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re),
[1998] 1 SCR 27 at para 21. As will be discussed, it has been followed with remarkable and uncritical
consistency ever since.
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backed, in that form, by the threat of legal violence—an association is forged without
reference to an external reality. These associations animate the organization of
governmental force. Interpretation is inherently political and necessarily unconstrained by
the words at issue.
The processes of expression and interpretation are highly complex in our current
iteration of governance. As alternative sites of adjudication continue to arise and flourish,
the state monopoly on definitional sense grows ever more diffusive. In place of any
engagement with the politics of meaning, the official approach to interpretation is based
on amorphous principles that mask the play(s) of power in the administrative state. When
legal decision-makers impose their worldview on linguistic disagreements, they
invariably perpetuate the current logic of hierarchical authority. If words are given
meaning within the interpreting subject, and are always already refracted through one’s
largely unconscious biases, then legal definitions reflect the dominant perspective of the
sociocultural elite. This is a problem that is exacerbated by the doctrinal approach to
linguistic ordering, which presents a barrage of structuring concepts as an overdetermined thesis of legitimation. These principles naturalize the current distribution of
power by presenting political decisions as the ‘ordinary grammar’ of law. Otherness is
rendered nonsensical under the “modern principle” of interpretation.
My first chapter unpacks this rhetorical landscape, emphasizing both the
impossibility of its terms and the insidious consequences of its distortive effect. I reject
the idea that language can be predictably ordered through conservative ideals that are,
themselves, more language in need of interpretation. The prevailing approach presumes
to answer the challenges of signification with a foundation built entirely upon the same
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unverifiable language, ignoring the uncomfortable conclusion that it is language all the
way down. In my second chapter, this problem is explored in the context of
administrative law and its dominant discourse. There is no greater challenge to those
wishing to confront the current empire of language than the administrative state.
Organizing principles like expertise and deferential respect provide further layers of
ideological naturalization, suggesting that there is something out there, accessible to the
legal elites, that resolves linguistic conflict through impartial universality. Amidst the
constant misdirection of a regime that both enjoys and obscures the play of its structure, I
ask a simple question: Who gets to speak when meaning is in dispute? Since every
interpretation is simply the ascension of a single, dominant perspective over all others,
the answer depends exclusively on whoever enjoys the last (authoritative) definitional
word.
The implications of this conclusion are considered at length in my third chapter,
which explicates the Supreme Court of Canada’s approach to construing language in
administrative law in the aftermath of its most recent doctrinal shift. In the decade since
the famous Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick decision, our highest court has reviewed
questions of language as though transcendent meaning is available through the distillation
of privileged legal reasoning.2 This evocation of neutrality allows the judiciary to forge
their preferred textual associations while denying any active interpretive agency. They
appear to be constrained and so divest themselves of responsibility through a series of
ideological tropes. Finally, my fourth chapter is an aspirational account of statutory
interpretation that remains mindful of its limits. When meaning is in dispute, resolution
depends on the ascension of a single perspective—and, in the absence of a metalanguage,
2

2008 SCC 9 [Dunsmuir].
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it always will. The possibility of progress, then, depends on transparent engagement with
the epistemological limits of interpretation. By presenting the constellation of signs that
surround each definitional choice, we create sites of disagreement that require the explicit
consideration of divergent perspectives.

5

II. A Principled Landscape and Its Discontents
The administrative state is a highly contingent outcome of institutional practices
and traditions. While it is hardly novel to assert that state power is historically
constructed, there is a growing sense, both in the literature and relevant jurisprudence,
that a “deep structure”3—founded on principles of constitutionalism and democracy—
moves this form of governance into the realm of impersonal objectivity. 4 This
transcendence assuages our collective discomfort with bureaucratic discretion; the
considerable authority vested in individual decision-makers comes predetermined by
ideas like ‘non-arbitrariness’ and ‘consistency.’ 5 Our long entrenched constitutional
values foreground the personalized nature of discretion while protecting us from its
tyrannical corollary: the simple paradox that it always imports a range of legitimate
decisions. On this orthodox (and deeply romantic) reading, administrative law is an
arbitrary organization of institutional power only in a narrow, logistical sense. Its
underlying principles animate and inform our constitutional democracy and provide an
enclosed justificatory space. Where aberrations arise, judicial review safeguards “the rule
of law as a fundamental postulate of our constitutional structure.”6

3

David Dyzenhaus, “The Deep Structure of Roncarelli v. Duplessis” (2008) 53 UNBLJ 111. While he
refers specifically to this foundational judgment, his discussion on the separation of powers and the ‘rule of
law’ resonate more broadly within the relevant jurisprudential field.
4
The clearest (or at least most sustained) valorization of objectivity in the corpus of administrative law is
Doré v Barreau du Québec, 2012 SCC 12, where (inter alia) an alleged lack of objectivity by a legal
professional horrified the Court. While this obviously demonstrates a belief in the concept of objectivity—
indeed, the Court locates such a quality as a worthy “public mandate” for professional self-governance
(para 8)—I am referring to something more specific. For instance, in Edmonton (City) v Edmonton East
(Capilano) Shopping Centres Ltd, 2016 SCC 47, the Court conceptualized a portion of relevant statutory
language through a guiding principle of “fairness,” which was immediately followed by a claim to
objectivity (para 115). Essentially, courts divest or eschew their interpretive subjecthood in favour of
universal structuring principles—or so the story goes.
5
See, e.g., Domtar Inc v Quebec (Commission d'appel en matière de lésions professionnelles), [1993] 2
SCR 756.
6
Roncarelli v Duplessis, [1959] SCR 121 at 142.
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These apparent structuring concepts will be discussed at length below, but it is
important at the outset to contextualize the interrelation between governing principles and
administrative authority. Although the phrasing is highly variable, the dominant view of
bureaucratic governance posits coherence through the presence of neutral limits. It rejects
“the instrumentalist conception of law” and thereby locates constitutionalized
administration within an apolitical space.7 This is an area bounded by its commitments to
competence, fairness, and specified authority; 8 there is an articulable sphere of
justification that constrains the decision-maker even while it gives content to her
reasoning. Just as the outer limits are policed for “expertise, deliberation, and reason
giving,” we can also “look inside the agency for administrative legitimacy.”9 We are, in
other words, beneficiaries of an enclosed system of regulation. Macrocosmic principles
promote consistency that finds expression in the varied microcosms of bureaucratic
adjudication.
It is important, then, to pull at the thread of this dominant image and consider the
possibility of interpretive guidance via structuring principles. These claims to objectivity
are not simply popular academic arguments; rather, the development of administrative
law is largely predicated on the practical utility of these ethereal concepts.10 The play of
power in the administrative state is either obscured behind this rhetoric of
constitutionalism and communal predictability or it is largely nonexistent. Certainly, on

7

Murray Hunt, “Constitutionalism and the Contractualisation of Government in the United Kingdom” in
Michael Taggart, ed, The Province of Administrative Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1997) 21 at 22.
8
Halsbury’s Laws of Canada, Administrative Law, “Overview of Administrative Law” (I.1) at HAD-1
[Halsbury’s, Administrative Law].
9
Sidney Shapiro, Elizabeth Fisher & Wendy Wagner, “The Enlightenment of Administrative Law:
Looking Inside the Agency for Legitimacy” (2012) 47 Wake Forest L Rev 465 at 467.
10
In Ocean Port Hotel Ltd v British Columbia (General Manager, Liquor Control and Licensing Branch),
2001 SCC 52, the Court explicitly leans on structuring principles in the application and operation of
judicial review.
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the prevailing view, courts and adjudicators hold tremendous coercive authority, but there
is no play in that structure.11 Instead, governmental force is dispersed toward greater
efficiency while concentrated in preternaturally available principles.
There is perhaps no other area of the law so replete with references to
metanarratives like ‘the rule of law’ or ‘legislative intent.’ While this paper is hardly the
forum for an exhaustive analysis of either concept, the ability of any such device to
structure state power is a matter of considerable interest. The discourse surrounding the
administrative state bleeds into doctrinal development—our collective comfort with
interpretive principles renders further reform ostensibly redundant. Although the current
reliance on these rhetorical devices could be assessed in relation to varied iterations of
governmental power, there is perhaps no greater test than that posed by statutory
interpretation. The problem of linguistic indeterminacy forces the state to impose its
dominant perspective as some form of objective truth—a matter that is further
complicated by the range of legitimacy mandated by our ideas of administrative
governance.12
(a.) At Play in the Field of Language
Decades ago, a prominent postmodern theorist declared us all inmates in the
prison-house of language.13 This idea, that we are constituted and constrained within
psycho-linguistic patterns, is best understood in light of its philosophical development.
The starting point is largely uncontroversial: Language is an arbitrary system imposed on
11

In Baker v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 SCR 817, where the coercive
power of the administrative state was on full display, the Court offers a comforting narrative where
“discretion must be exercised in accordance with the boundaries imposed in the statute, the principles of the
rule of law, the principles of administrative law, the fundamental values of Canadian society, and the
principles of the Charter” (p 820).
12
See, e.g., Mellor v Saskatchewan (Workers' Compensation Board), 2012 SKCA 10 at para 26.
13
Fredric Jameson, The Prison-House of Language: A Critical Account of Structuralism and Russian
Formalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972).
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the observable or articulable world. Few would argue that, to use Ferdinand de Saussure’s
famous example, our word for ‘tree’ has any inherent connection to the perennial plant to
which we thereby refer.14 The study of semiotics is a helpful conceptual device here, as it
separates linguistic signs from what they signify—they can and should be considered as
distinct parts of a socially manufactured relationship.15 Claims to definitional meaning
seek to privilege a specific sign/signified association; for instance, when the Supreme
Court defines “termination by an employer” to include “bankruptcy,” they give legal
force to the association between these textual signifiers. Obviously, the result is more
than semantics given the authority of judicial interpretation.16
Moving from this background theory, numerous thinkers began to question the
authorship of constructed language. If the sounds and symbols that constitute our
thoughts and communications are contingent on accepted customs, how and why were
these customs created? The scholarship on this point is rich, but a concise account is
provided in Jean Baudrillard’s Simulacra and Simulation: Language mediates our
perceptions of the world in a manner that perpetuates the current distribution of power.17
Put another way, if there is no natural connection between words and what they signify,

14

Ferdinand de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, translated by Wade Baskin (New York: Columbia
University Press, 2011) at X.
15
Writing in a more overtly critical context, Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno describe the
implications of this analytical distinction: “[W]ord and content were at once different from each other and
indissolubly linked. … The trenchant distinction which declares the word itself fortuitous and its allocation
to its object arbitrary does away with the superstitious commingling of word and thing” (Dialectic of
Enlightenment, translated by Edmond Jephcott (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002) at chapter VI).
16
One is reminded here of the striking opening sentences in Robert Cover’s “Violence and the Word”
(1986) 95 Yale LJ 1601: “Legal interpretive acts signal and occasion the imposition of violence upon
others: A judge articulates her understanding of a text, and as a result, somebody loses his freedom, his
property, his children, even his life.”
17
Jean Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation, translated by Sheila Faria Glaser (Ann Arbor: University of
Michigan Press, 1994) at 27. In this particularly lucid passage, he goes on to say that “[i]t is always the goal
of the ideological analysis to restore the objective process, it is always a false problem to wish to restore the
truth beneath the simulacrum.”
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language itself becomes deeply personal.18 The sign/signified interrelationship can never
be empirically assessed; there is no control group and there never will be. We assume
communicative clarity when our grammatical understandings appear to align, but I will
never know how my ‘tree’ signifies in relation to yours.19 Further explanations are
vulnerable to the same linguistic difficulties. Of course, we can both point at the same
object, pronouncing it a ‘tree,’ but the linguistic signifier remains one of more general
application. This is stretched to extremes in the relevant legal context, as we cannot
collectively point at, say, ‘fairness’ or ‘expertise’ except in discrete and contentious
manifestations.20
The critical project here involves a consideration of which definitions prevail and
become markers of elite discourse. No one can claim access to the linguistic equivalent of
Platonic ideal forms, so the interpretive project involves privileging the dominant
perspective and superimposing those linguistic associations onto the texts that animate
our legal system. 21 This, of course, is a highly diffuse phenomenon; there are

18

This raises the complex question of how group-based power functions in the absence of straightforward
communication. The indeterminacy of language is the same at the top of the hierarchy. For the purposes of
this discussion, it suffices to observe that “[t]ruth is produced by large social apparatuses and is thus
implicated in the distribution of power relations. It is never ‘outside power,’ but is always ‘a thing of this
world.’” In other words, the dominant perspective is the source of mainstream textual associations;
powerful groups relate linguistically based on a shared perspective of the real. See: Linda Alcoff, Real
Knowing: New Versions of the Coherence Theory (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996) at 134.
19
The idea that linguistic interactions are largely unproblematic is evocative of HLA Hart’s penumbral
distinction, but perhaps the most sustained apologia for “practical certainty” is found in (the aptly named)
Kent Greenawalt, Law and Objectively (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992) esp at 72 [Law and
Objectivity].
20
Perhaps the clearest jurisprudential example arises in Canada (Attorney General) v Mavi, 2011 SCC 30,
where the Supreme Court disagreed with the appellate judgment on the content of procedural fairness. This
is, of course, only one (albeit the most common) form of the ‘fairness’ signifier, but it is worth noting how
many ill-defined concepts constitute the Court’s understanding of this requirement. For instance, “while the
content of procedural fairness varies with circumstances and the legislative and administrative context, it is
certainly not to be presumed that Parliament intended that administrative officials be free to deal unfairly
with people subject to their decisions” (para 39). In other words, fairness is not unfairness.
21
It is important to note the movement from individualized linguistic subjecthood to the consolidation of
group power through dominant interpretations. If there is no inherent content in interpretive prompts, one
might expect greater randomness and more discrete pockets of authority. However, as will be discussed
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innumerable long histories of authoritative exegesis as a means of social control, and the
suggestion that Canadian statutory interpretation has a unique claim to our postmodern
incredulity is tenuous at best. Directing this theoretical lens at agency interpretation and
its judicial limits does, however, facilitate a sustained examination of the play(s) of power
in the administrative state. Our legal institutions, backed by a scholarly tradition of trust
in principles, posit an enclosed system whereby administrators act within neutral bounds
and courts police the conceptual borderlands.22 This narrative is proffered as a thesis of
legitimation, but its foundation of principles depends heavily on linguistic determinacy.
Administrative authority can only be governed by ideas like ‘the rule of law’ if they hold
meaning that signifies beyond individual actors. 23 More specifically, the normative
framework of interpretation avoids careful scrutiny through its multitude of governing
precepts: One does not easily untangle, for instance, the idea that “[j]udicial review seeks
to address an underlying tension between the rule of law and the foundational democratic
principle, which finds an expression in the initiatives of Parliament and legislatures to
create various administrative bodies and endow them with broad powers.”24 Presumptions
that inform the play(s) of power in the administrative state are either unarticulated or
presented within a complex matrix of rarely defined principles.25

below, language signifies based largely on personal biases and histories—which are, of course, widely
shared amongst the sociocultural elite.
22
This is perhaps most concisely stated in the decision penned by Binnie J in Alberta (Information and
Privacy Commissioner) v Alberta Teachers' Association, 2011 SCC 61.
23
As Joseph Singer observes, “[d]eterminacy is necessary to the ideology of the rule of law, for both
theorists and judges. It is the only way judges can appear to apply the law rather than make it” (“The Player
and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory” (1984) 94:1 Yale LJ 1 at 12).
24
Dunsmuir, supra note 2.
25
I.e., administrative law takes a number of (contested) positions on the conditions of legality. These
become “the central ideology of social order” and resist sustained scrutiny by virtue of their interlocking
and ill-defined character. See: JC Smith, “Psychoanalytic Jurisprudence and the Limits of Traditional Legal
Theory” in Richard Devlin, ed, Canadian Perspectives on Legal Theory (Toronto: Emond Montgomery
Publications, 1991) 223 at 225.
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While this justificatory space could be evaluated in various contexts, the process
and review of administrative hermeneutics is particularly instructive. Amidst claims to
unverifiable and deeply personal sign/signifier associations, the expression of
institutional theories of governance (whether express or implied) is inevitable. Put
another way, interpreting language at the intersection of Parliament and the judiciary
requires some explicit engagement with state power. If the ability to give content to
contentious legal language is assigned to boards and tribunals, then this relatively new
governmental iteration must be justified—at least to the extent of developing a working
scope of decision-making authority.26 The interplay between agencies and courts in the
process of interpretation tells us something important about the source(s) of the dominant
perspective. There is compelling reason to understand definitional work as the imposition
of a privileged viewpoint at the expense of all others, and so delineating an interpretive
claim space requires an institutional show of power; that is, when performing legal
hermeneutics, it is helpful to begin by asking who gets to speak when meaning is in
dispute. This question is most comprehensively answered through a preliminary
examination of how linguistic authority is constructed.
1. Form is Content: A Preliminary Discussion
The form/content (inter)relationship is well known in literary fields, but state
actors rarely discuss how their surroundings shape the construction of statutory
meaning.27 There is, however, a latent understanding in our institutional literature that
26

On this point, Sara Blake’s synthesis of the case law is helpful. She notes that administrators are seen as
“fill[ing] in the details” of general statutes, and she notes that tribunals both implement and are bound by
legislative language (Administrative Law in Canada, 5th ed (Markham: LexisNexis Canada Inc, 2011) at
3).
27
For a formative work on the subject, see: Walter Benjamin, “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical
Reproduction” in Illuminations: Essays and Reflections, translated by Harry Zohn (New York: Schoken
Books, 2007) 217.
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each locus of authority brings something unique to the act (or, more precisely, the
outcome) of governing. In administrative hermeneutics, the language most overtly at
issue is often legislative; words embodied in statutory instruments are sources of
authority and the material from which interpretations arise. There are numerous
theoretical stances on how the act of legislating does and should impact how we
understand the result, but uncovering linguistic power in the administrative state requires
a broader conceptualization of texts. This insight is perhaps most succinctly put in
Jacques Derrida’s famous critique of Saussure: “There is nothing outside of the text.”28
The distinction is, however, nuanced to the extent that no locus of embedded textual
meaning exists; instead, texts are constituted by individuals’ acts of working through
them.29 This evokes the intuitive notion that formal characteristics affect the content of
language, but this does not produce a meta-language—my engagement with institutional
inflections is itself a textual process, broadly construed.
How, then, are the texts of agency statutory interpretation shaped by the space
from which they issue?30 In a recent discussion of appropriate interpretive contours, the
Supreme Court held that “[w]here the ordinary tools of statutory interpretation lead to a
single reasonable interpretation and the administrative decision maker adopts a different
interpretation, its interpretation will necessarily be unreasonable — no degree of

28

Jacques Derria, Of Grammatology, 40th anniversary ed, translated by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak
(Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2016) at X [Of Grammatology]. Emphasis in original.
29
In the translator’s preface to this edition of Derrida’s text, he writes that “[t]he book is not repeatable in
its ‘identity’: each reading of the book produces a simulacrum of an ‘original’ that is itself the mark of the
shifting and unstable subject … the book’s repetitions are always other than the book” (ibid at xxx).
30
The idea that there is a “correct version” of a statutory instrument is based, at least in part, on the
function of hierarchical interpretation: The authoritative decision-maker forecloses alternate possibilities
toward the ascendancy of a single, elite perspective. See: Daniel Del Gobbo, “Unreliable Narration in Law
and Fiction” (2017) 30:2 Can JL & Jur 311 at 330.
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deference can justify its acceptance.”31 Although Moldaver J, writing for the majority
here, indicates that ‘ambiguity’ will afford an agency with greater discretion, this
distinction rests on the presumed content of “ordinary tools.” This mechanism nominally
vests discretion in boards and tribunals while retaining authority in a familiar way. By
evoking the discoverable content of interpretive tools, this holding suggests the presence
of a neutral threshold for agency decision-making. Of course, it remains a judicial
determination whether a single reasonable interpretation exists and, given the
impossibility of a universally “ordinary” set of hermeneutical methods, this approach can
always justify either outcome. In other words, as Ruth Sullivan bluntly puts it,
“administrators can neither make law (that is the job of the legislature) nor determine its
true meaning (that is the job of the courts).”32 Agency interpretation takes place under
judicial supervision that is self-policing. The resultant texts of exegesis must resolve
linguistic ambiguity within an institutional structure that considers them “more or less
persuasive” opinions.33 While this apparent supremacy is at odds with the deferential bent
that characterizes judicial self-perceptions, the foregoing theoretical lens provides an
important insight into the exceptionalization of statutory interpretation in the
administrative state.
Given the fundamental conceit of postmodern linguistics—i.e., that “by an
awareness of the arbitrariness of the sign … the entire question of meaning can be

31

McLean v British Columbia (Securities Commission), 2013 SCC 67 at para 38 [McLean].
Ruth Sullivan, Sullivan on the Construction of Statutes, 6th ed (Markham: LexisNexis Canada Inc, 2014)
at 710. On its face, Moldaver J’s sentiment seems to allow for some agencies to ‘make’ law, but the judicial
ability to find just one reasonable definition undermines that idea. McLean is always available for judges to
impose a preferred perspective by collapsing the “range” of possible meanings. When agencies make law, it
is because judges have allowed it.
33
Ibid.
32
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bracketed” 34 —the claim that textual signifiers can produce a “single reasonable
interpretation” appears markedly unsophisticated. This point requires some familiarity
with administrative law standards of review, which depart from the treatment of
reasonableness and correctness set out in Housen v. Nikolaisen. 35 While these two
standards remain, the relevant question has been described as “resolving the basic tension
between legislative intent and safeguarding the rule of law.”36 On the orthodox view,
courts recognize that Parliament took active steps to divest them of authority, yet limits
must be enforced where a tribunal exceeds its delegated mandate. The result is a
reasonableness standard where the “standard of review analysis” finds that deference is
warranted.37 This invokes a “margin of appreciation” where the impugned decision must
fall “within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible.” 38
Conversely, a finding that the correctness standard is appropriate justifies unilateral
reversal where judges disagree.
This doctrinal foundation is difficult to reconcile with the problems of linguistic
meaning. If language is both arbitrary and deeply personal, there is little to suggest that a
“range of acceptable” definitions will ever exist.39 It should be noted, however, that
judicial review of administrative hermeneutics also produces an occasional progressive
remark. After all, gestures toward deference are not usually dispensed with even in the

34

Paul de Man, “Semiology and Rhetoric” in Vincent Leitch et al, eds, The Norton Anthology of Theory
and Criticism, 2nd ed (New York: WW Norton & Co, 2010) 1365 at 1367.
35
2002 SCC 33.
36
Halsbury’s, Administrative Law, supra note 8 at HAD-106.
37
Dunsmuir, supra note 2 at para 29. This is determined with reference to four questions: “(1) the presence
or absence of a privative clause; (2) the purpose of the tribunal as determined by interpretation of enabling
legislation; (3) the nature of the question at issue, and; (4) the expertise of the tribunal” (para 64).
38
Ibid at para 47.
39
Ibid.
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interpretive forum,40 and definitional ranges have been described as legitimate.41 This
produces a “paradox of deference” where permissible analytical difference leads to
divergent interpretations.42 If supervising courts are sincere about granting “a measure of
deference” to administrative decision-makers,43 then alternative interpretations—which
logically arise from divergent hermeneutical processes—are owed some measure of
respect. The difficulty here, even if clumsily or evasively put by the bench, is reconciling
the idea of deference with that of adjudicative merit.
Contemporary understandings of language resolve any apparent paradox
regarding incongruous definitions, but only the staunchest postmodern skeptic would
suggest that legal interpretations cannot be better or worse in how they affect subjects. It
is therefore understandable that judges, working in good faith, might wish to subordinate
difference in favour of a “single reasonable interpretation.” Certainly, the general
jurisprudence on statutory interpretation is replete with claims to transcendent epistemic
capacity; there is, after all, only “one principle or approach” for divining true legislative
meaning.44 Elsewhere, I have discussed the vacuous rhetoric of the prevailing approach to
legal hermeneutics, arguing further that the suggestive notion of interpretive correctness
constitutes an effort to privilege a dominant worldview and immunize it from critical
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scrutiny.45 My interest here is more specific, but in service of a broader inquiry: What
does the interplay between institutional actors making claims to linguistic certainty tell us
about the play(s) of power in the administrative state? Accepting that language can never
signify beyond the individual, we can productively examine governmental efforts to
obscure this subjectivity. Questions of interpretation are inflected by the authoritative
scope of each state branch, but, at a high level of generality, this is simply the procession
of linguistic simulacra. As institutional actors impose their dominant perspective upon
textual signifiers, they rely on a series of unstated presumptions that can be productively
unpacked toward a “logic of bureaucracy” and coherent critique of interpretive
authority.46
2. In/determinacy and Applied Linguistic Meaning
Returning, then, to my opening claim—that the administrative state is a
historically contingent organization of governance—there is a significant interrelation
between linguistic instability and the critical project of unsettling regulatory convention.
Definitional power issuing from varied sources obscures the arbitrariness of the sign.
Official interpretations are given the endorsement of ‘legal reasoning’ and proffered as
apolitical assertions of fact. In the administrative context, there is almost constant
recourse to decisional ‘expertise,’ which is seen as a justification for hermeneutical
deference from the bench. Of course, understanding language as an inherently
unknowable construct effectively dismantles the idea that someone could be an expert of
interpretation; if there is no “transcendental signifier,” to use Derrida’s phrase, then there
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is no education or experience that produces exegetical proximity to it. 47 Doctrinal
misdirection of this sort will be discussed at greater length below, but it is important at
the outset to frame this critique within its larger theoretical ambitions. An attack on the
stability of language destabilizes the jurisprudential foundations of administrative law.
This is perhaps why a long tradition of respected scholarship stands for the dominant
proposition that, semiotics aside, we can have faith in legal coherence founded upon
meta-principles. To suggest otherwise is to succumb to the nihilism of indeterminacy:
The suggestion that we can never move language beyond the self would “undermine any
attempt to articulate a vision of a more humane society, even one without laws.”48
Discomfort of this sort is not, however, a compelling reason for uncritical acceptance.
This is not to suggest that critics of the poststructuralist legal vision hinge their
arguments on practicalities of implication. There is no singular apologia for a determinate
system of laws, but some instructive generalizations can be made. My central argument
here is that the rhetoric of interpretive certainty obscures the imposition of dominant
values as hermeneutical ‘truth.’ A more moderate position can be traced back to HLA
Hart’s argument that “[c]anons of ‘interpretation’ cannot eliminate, though they can
diminish, these uncertainties; for these canons are themselves general rules for the use of
language, and make use of general terms which themselves require interpretation.”49 He
famously locates a “core of certainty,”50 thus acknowledging the epistemic problem
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without the invocation of radical critique. In response to this infinite regress of
interpreting interpretations, numerous scholars have adopted an analogous approach: Few
argue that legal interpretation is always stable or predetermined by official rules,51 but the
mainstream view posits the routine, apolitical character of our daily recourse to the law.52
This view has been most thoroughly attacked by the “indeterminacy thesis” arising from
the Critical Legal Studies movement. Although variations on its themes proliferate, it
remains helpful to trace the general contours of this argument to position this analysis of
legal interpretation within the broader claim that law is indeterminate.
The foundation of this claim is eponymous—i.e., that our laws fail to anticipate
the situations upon which they are imposed—but the critical treatment of this idea is
more complex. Even those sympathetic to the play of language tend to retain some sense
of discernment regarding legal arguments. Arguably, we are told very little by the bare
signifiers that make up “procedural fairness” but significantly more by the rule that “[a]
person is deemed not to have attained a specified number of years of age until the
commencement of the anniversary, of the same number, of the day of that person’s
birth.”53 This is not to disregard the divergent institutional purposes of these texts, but
rather to foreground the apparent determinacy of the latter quotation. It is straightforward
to imagine a hierarchy of arguments regarding the age of a person in relation to this
legislation; of course, one could argue that its enforcement in a given case would defeat
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the purpose of the enactment or some other inventive argument, but, generally speaking,
one expects to determine age by reference to the statutory formula.
We rely on some form of universal signification to structure our daily
experiences. Until an alternative argument gains credibility, interested parties will, for
instance, employ the above statutory directive to determine age in routine matters. The
implications of this ostensible “core of certainty” for the indeterminacy thesis are
succinctly described by Mark Tushnet:
Lawyers find it easy to resolve controversies when one side offers an
argument that merely satisfies the “straight face” test and the other offers a
stronger one. The general idea would be to say that indeterminacy truly
exists only when "reasonably powerful" arguments are available on either
side of a legal proposition. This response does not take the implications of
the sociological perspective fully into account. [An argument becomes]
professionally respectable when a socially significant set of legal actors
[begin] to make it. In this sense professional respectability derives from a
certain type of social or political power. Again to generalize, as those legal
actors gain even more power (or lose it), the … argument[s] they make
will become “reasonably powerful” (or will revert to being frivolous).54
In other words, the threshold of indeterminacy is often presented as situational: Many
will agree that a constitutional interpretation with strong arguments on both sides is
logically indeterminate; few will agree that the application of the foregoing anniversary
formula presents the same challenges. We are reminded, however, that the persuasiveness
of a legal argument is always the product of sociological forces. An idea that is currently
obscure—e.g., that such a method of calculating age is discriminatory on the basis of
irrelevant physical criteria—can become powerful given the right combination of
resources and publicity.
The radical character of the indeterminacy thesis can be productively considered
using the same example. This is, after all, an academic movement based on destabilizing
54
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foundational presumptions.55 Chronological age is as close to an objective fact as we are
likely to find. Presuming an uncontroversial date of birth, the ensuing calculation is
nominally determinate. Proponents of the relevant thesis would diverge on this issue.
While some distortion necessarily attends this form of generalization, John Hasnas
productively delineates two approaches to the implications of indeterminacy. On one
side, the paradoxically named “mainstream Crits” are mindful of law’s various internal
inconsistencies but “cannot advocate abandoning the legal regulation of human activity
since this would simply allow the underlying hierarchies to flourish.”56 Rules such as the
age example form the constituent parts of a system that perpetuates the current
distribution of power. Since the invocation of legal texts depends on the necessarily
political movement from ‘facts’ to ‘law,’ even apparently clear enactments are
fundamentally indeterminate: The operation of law is instrumental and malleable, but
always issuing from a locus of authority. Predictability, in other words, is compatible
with indeterminacy; one can be unsurprised that legal texts operate to privilege dominant
interests while still holding to the belief that law is indeterminate. As Joseph Singer
convincingly demonstrates, our system fails to be “comprehensive, consistent, directive
and self-revising,” which are preconditions for logical determinacy.57 For the so-called
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“mainstream Crits,” this does not mean we can dispense with legality; rather, to the
extent that, say, the indeterminate age rule keeps children out of exploitative work
conditions, it must be supported in spite of its amorphous character.58
Conversely, the “irrationalists” distrust the narrative of progress advanced by their
mainstream counterparts.59 If an inherently malleable set of rules is being simultaneously
applied and abused by the institutional elite, then law reform is an empty promise that
obscures the need for more radical change. This stance has been derided as a form of
useless nihilism, but such criticisms depend on the scope of one’s transformative
ambitions. Given their explicit disdain for improving an indeterminate legal order,
moderate commentators find little utility in the irrationalist call for profound (and, to be
fair, seemingly unlikely) change. On its own terms, this perspective is one of extreme
optimism: Decisional action can, of course, take place outside of the legal system.60 This
claim is arguably progressive in a way that most advocacy for choice ignores—that is, as
feminist scholars point out, the illusion of choice does significant damage by presuming
an equal footing upon which everyone decides under the barely disguised operation of
formal equality—because it has the potential to drastically reframe the relations that are
constituted by legal structures. This radical side of the indeterminacy thesis is well
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described by one of its detractors as working to “unfreeze [the] false sense of necessity”
in governmental structures.61 Rejecting the more easily applied critiques of legal inequity,
this stance on indeterminacy usefully foregrounds the incoherence of law’s
metaprinciples.
Much has been written on the subject of legal indeterminacy and a full-scale
discussion of those debates would require more pages than necessary for the salient point
here. The administrative state has a unique relationship with textual determinacy, which
is stretched to extremes in the context of statutory interpretation. It is profoundly
destabilizing to confront the malleability of all legal rules, but learning from this applied
exercise in poststructural skepticism does not require the resolution of unsolvable
problems. Both mainstream and irrationalist notions of indeterminacy (or, more
specifically, the implications thereof) foreground the plight of the embodied legal subject.
Of course, meaning has been imposed at least to the extent that the law can work injustice
while advancing its dominant interests—on that, there is little disagreement from the
critical movement. Internal disagreement instead concerns the action necessitated by this
recognition. The pertinent question, then, is the role of the subject in relation to legal
texts. This is, in many ways, a heavily abstract point, but one that is brilliantly described
by the judge character in Cormac McCarthy’s Blood Meridian:
The truth about the world, he said, is that anything is possible. Had you
not seen it all from birth and thereby bled it of its strangeness it would
appear to you for what it is, a hat trick in a medicine show, a fevered
dream, a trance bepopulate with chimeras having neither analogue nor
precedent, an itinerant carnival, a migratory tentshow whose ultimate
destination after many a pitch in many a mudded field is unspeakable and
calamitous beyond reckoning.
…
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Even in this world more things exist without our knowledge than with it
and the order in creation which you see is that which you have put there,
like a string in a maze, so that you shall not lose your way.62
The maze of agency interpretation is guided by a rhetorical string that provides the
illusion of order. Working through texts remains a constitutive process and, as the
indeterminacy thesis demonstrates, it exists in a fundamentally contingent relationship
with each legal actor.
On almost any reading, our legal texts require interpretation. Even the most
radical indeterminacy arguments suggests a reformative process whereby individual
meaning is construed through both intuitive and conversational means—viz., a holistic
version of personal hermeneutics. The foregoing discussion of legal epistemology adds a
further layer to our inquiry: If even qualified versions of linguistic stability (e.g., the
generally accepted operation of a statutory enactment) are vulnerable to shifting meaning,
how can statutory interpretation (i.e., the literal imposition of meaning onto unknowably
personal textual signifiers) ever make claims to objectivity via structuring principles? In
the administrative state, power is conferred through legislative text while the bounds of
that authority is policed by the judiciary.63 More broadly, as we have seen, the process of
textual signification extends well beyond words of enactment; our interpretive techniques
themselves, along with those who apply them, are constituted by the same ambiguities of
language. There is no meta-language for the neutral displacement of linguistic
subjectivity. Much like the proponents of the indeterminacy thesis, we arrive at the
endpoint of textual skepticism and must reconcile an opposition: the problems of
language with our system of legal signs.
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In this way, the process and review of agency interpretation facilitates both a
deconstructive and progressive project. There is perhaps no greater test of conceptual
authority than the officially sanctioned ability to impose sign associations as legal truths.
By demonstrating the failure of language to signify beyond the subject, the
poststructuralist account of interpretation reminds us that every definition is an
affirmation of the self. While the current judicial mandate posits “one principle or
approach,” the discrete analytical moves from legislative text to definitional meaning do
not hold in a world of arbitrary signs reflecting only themselves. In the absence of a
metalanguage, there is some hope for a progressive response rather than nihilistic
silence;64 presumably, one does not acknowledge the meaninglessness of language only
to stop speaking.65 There is no single reasonable interpretation but this recognition does
not require linguistic tyranny. Instead, when we appreciate interpretation as an ascension
of a single perspective, we can reorient the debate about how legislation should signify.
The question is one of accountability and is necessarily normative: Who should speak
when meaning is in dispute? This complex question is best approached by turning to the
intellectual development of the administrative state—not because there is an externally
available past full of enlightened guidance, but rather because it foregrounds the
contingent nature of our interpretive presumptions. Whatever the jurisprudence suggests,
there is nothing inevitable about the institutional spaces from which legal definitions
arise. It remains nonetheless essential to account for the status quo in terms of its
justificatory trajectory, not least for the gaps and elisions which thereby become manifest.
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(b.) Toward an Interpretive Claim-Space
Legal interpretations render a single perspective with the force of law. Behind this
truism lies an uncomfortable relationship between the necessity of construing textual laws
and the violence of supplanting alternative perspectives in favour of one dominant
semiotic association. In the absence of an easy explanation, the state turns to the tropes of
ideological misdirection. The prevailing image of legal hermeneutics evokes a bounded
democratic process of governmental harmony. Parliament writes, agencies read, and
judges supervise. Even the doctrine recognizes that complexities arise, but this broad
generalization is presented as the hard-won product of historical forces—of progress and
development.66 In other words, the administrative state produces efficient, specialized
regulation and the threat of “untrammeled discretion,” as recognized by Rand J, is
suppressed through law’s internal commitments. Pulling at the thread of this narrative and
asking legal actors to account for the politics of interpretation requires an understanding
of how these power relations are obscured in the mainstream discourse. One critic,
writing in the tradition of Guattari, succinctly notes that “[e]conomic and political power
is inconceivable without the production of subjections and significations that determine
for each person the position one is to occupy.”67 Through subtle appeals to a natural order
and doctrinal evolution, judges distract us from the unilateral force that underwrites every
legal definition.
In Marxian thought, the basic moves of ideological rhetoric are simple but
profoundly effective. The state historicizes, naturalizes, and eternalizes in an effort to
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“‘disappear’ that which tends to contradict [dominant ideology] or expose its
repressions.”68 In a simplified sense, all of this is to say that those in power are motivated
to render the status quo as the culmination of linear work toward the enlightened present
that reflects the natural order of things, and which will abide indefinitely, barring
regression.69 The result preempts critical reflection; it is ahistorical while ostensibly
looking backwards. Perhaps unsurprisingly given its internal tensions, the law of
interpretation relies heavily on these ideological devices. In almost textbook fashion, the
modern principle announces that “[t]oday there is only one principle or approach.”
Judgments that write these words never engage with the seemingly obvious questions of
‘why?’ and ‘how did we get here?’ In a much broader sense, the sites of interpretation in
administrative law manifest as neutral and evolved spaces for democratic adjudication.
Ideas like deference, the rule of law, consistency, and constitutionalism pervade the
relevant judgments as though they mean something fixed and discoverable.
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interpretive system by focusing on the very questions it obscures. 72 The law of
interpretation rests on a series of premises that are presented as axiomatic. In an effort to
step outside the deemed legitimacy of our current interpretive regime, it is helpful to
begin by working through the process and review of agency interpretation, which is both
an institutional and individualized legal event. Someone interprets by forging an
associative bond, and this perspective compels through the operation of institutional
power and positioning. As will be discussed in the following chapters, the circumstances
of interpretation play an important conceptual role here, but the inherent play of language
is invulnerable to analytical mandates and institutional specialization. Indeed, even Hart
would have observed that meta-rules such as reading “the entire context” in its “ordinary
meaning” are themselves linguistically constructed and would need definitions for
consistent application—which, of course, continues ad infinitum.73 The bleakness of this
outlook is perhaps mitigated by a degree of critical self-awareness; although our legal
landscape is made up of words piled upon words, this paper can be read and we can
invoke ‘statutory interpretation’ without a great deal of linguistic discomfort.
An understanding of this irony, whereby language is deemed uselessly personal in
a written argument that at least tries for external signification, exists in opposition to the
aforementioned ideological tropes. Legal interpretation depends on the stability of
language; otherwise, it is the arbitrary ascendancy of one elite perspective over all others.
More than this, though, the current regime implies the progressive enlightenment of the
spaces from which interpretations issue—again, through ideology that historicizes,
72
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naturalizes, and eternalizes. A close reading of that which is excluded from statutory
interpretation—i.e., the content before the “today” of the modern principle—is important
for unpacking the power relations that inhere to the construction of legal language.
Before we can insist upon transparent engagement with the foregoing linguistic irony
(that is, admitting that we cannot know language outside ourselves, even as we use it to
demand this form of accountability), we must dismantle the idea that institutions speak
beyond the voices of their constituent actors. Our brand of democratic constitutionalism
can be read in a manner that facilitates the administrative state, but this is by no means
natural or inevitable—and the ensuing interpretations gain no greater universality by
virtue of our governmental arrangements.
1. Agency Hermeneutics: A Speculative History
There is no single history of administrative law in Canada, and what follows will
not be an exhaustive account of its development. I cannot advance both a critique of
linguistic stability and a unified historical narrative. Texts are invariably acted upon by
those who interpret them, and piecing together an account of the past is no different.
Laurent Binet, engaging with the limits of historical fiction, puts it concisely: “I don’t
want to write a historical handbook. This story is personal. That’s why my visions
sometimes get mixed up with the known facts. It’s just how it is. … Actually, no: that’s
not how it is. That would be too simple.” 74 These significant global problems
notwithstanding, the law provides some advantages as an area of inquiry. It is deeply
textual insofar as we have little difficulty sourcing the formative jurisprudence—though,
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of course, such records can never be taken at face value.75 Forging a story of legal history
is largely about imposing an ideational arc onto discrete texts that brought about specific
results. These are the raw materials from which we claim legal trends. 76 Literature
abounds on the possibility of historical facts and this project lacks the space to recount
that debate in significant detail. 77 Problems of textual signification are, if anything,
magnified in relation to the inaccessible past, and connections between these texts are
constructed with an eye toward a coherent narrative. Despite these epistemic challenges,
it is useful to contextualize administrative interpretation to foreground its historical and
intellectual contingency.78
There is an unfortunate trend in scholarship to “take for granted (or worse, ignore)
the importance of history (construed broadly here) in identifying the key conditions of
legality that characterize a particular legal system.”79 In administrative law, this has
obscured the significant and ideologically uncomfortable point that our background
“conditions of legality” could justify radically different outcomes. While agency
decision-makers complicate the classical view of our governmental branches, their
empowering principles are eminently familiar. Individual statutory instruments enable
75
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administrative agencies to perform discrete functions within the workings of our legal
system. Parliament enjoys virtually unlimited powers of delegation80 and must simply
provide a valid basis for official action.81 Despite this official story—which, through
naturalization, coalesces neatly into our present epoch of regulation—one can imagine a
markedly different approach forged from the same constituent parts. We have, in short,
constitutionalized courts and delegable powers—the regulatory permutations are virtually
endless. It is therefore important to reconsider the inner workings of the doctrinal
foundations that are said to animate our present forms of bureaucratic regulation.
Nearly a century ago, Walter Benjamin provided a helpful caveat for those who
wish to employ the past toward social critique: “To articulate the past historically does
not mean to recognize it ‘the way it really was’ (Ranke). It means to seize hold of a
memory as it flashes up at a moment of danger.”82 This is a welcome qualification given
my foregoing exposition on the unavailability of stable meaning. It also underscores a
recurring point: If the difficulties of historical evocation produce critical silence, the past
will simply be harnessed and manipulated by those in power.83 The point of this exercise
is well stated in a relatively recent valorization of historical method: “[L]egal history …
allows us to make our own decisions by seeing that there is nothing inevitable or
preordained in what we currently have.” 84 For my purposes, this observation leads
directly into the question of why permissive concepts in our legal order—that Parliament
can delegate and judges are constitutionally empowered to supervise the ensuing
80
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decisions—have been organized into a set of laws and rules that few would call
especially elegant or coherent. By most accounts, the answer lies in ideas of necessity:
Changes in social and economic conditions brought about utilitarian responses for
reasons we often seem to forget.
Writing about the period around Confederation, Colleen Flood and Jennifer
Dolling suggest that familiar “calls to establish an independent, apolitical regulatory
tribunal” impelled the earliest moves in this direction.85 At a high level of abstraction, the
desire for independent, alternative regulation was symptomatic of new forms of state
power. If this was the case in the mid- to late 19th century, then it certainly embodied a
renewed urgency as the state responded to the First World War and its
economic/regulatory impacts, which created a “massive expansion of government.”86 The
growth of administrative law is often associated with the rise of the “welfare state,”
which is hardly a stable locus of meaning. The salient point for our purposes, however, is
the idea of efficiency: Board and tribunals were seen as the “good and pragmatic”
solution to increasingly diverse governmental services.87 While it is difficult to argue
with the broad premise that more sites of adjudication facilitate more expeditious dispute
resolution, this form of governance also raised new questions. Increasingly, critics began
to ask
To what extent can these [private] areas of power be subject to traditional
notions of law with its emphasis on fixed and continuing principles with
general application, and upon a particular method of reasoning on the part
of legal institutions? The risk is that courts with their characteristic
methods of control … are either pushed to the margin of public affairs and
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become ineffectual, or that the exercise of legal control itself becomes
discretionary, sectional and subjective in the same way as the institutions
that it seeks to control.88
Both the foundational calls for an apolitical form of administrative governance and the
attendant discomfort with discretion and intervention continue today—an issue that is
further complicated by the overtly political character of some sites of administrative
interpretation (e.g., the decisions of civil servants). The result is a unique relationship
between administrative law and theory.89
Accordingly, the efforts of both Michael Taggart and Matthew Lewans to sketch
an intellectual history of the administrative state are invaluable. The anxiety of
administrative law development has remained more or less unchanged since the 19th
century: Formative actors confronted the persistent tension between Diceyan views of the
common law—i.e., that administrative law was antithetical to the proper English modes
of constitutional democracy90—and the burgeoning sense that bureaucratic regulation
“was one of the greatest legal developments of the century.”91 The stakes are particularly
high given the protracted contours of state/subject interaction in bureaucratic governance.
Simply put, administrative law requires (and has always required) an explicit theory of
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organization because of the state’s diverse delegated manifestations.92 Doctrinal and
theoretical development in this area is often characterized by a familiar preoccupation
with il/legitimate decision-making. Threshold conditions must emerge to distinguish
those who interpret with the force of law from everyone else. Lewans, writing both in the
present tense and in reference to historical forces, notes that “administrative law is
perceived primarily in terms of its outer limits.”93 As far back as the first-wave legal
realists, there is significant concern about the malleability of institutional roles which
allow judges to exercise their supervisory powers and perpetuate the current
(conservative) distribution of authority.94
The familiarity of these historical concerns is instructive. We do not naturally fear
non-judicial actors or locate our feelings about legislative delegation on a Diceyan
spectrum; rather, ideas about administrative law persist despite their origins in different
socioeconomic circumstances. There is no necessary relationship between these
preoccupations and the relevant subject matter, so there must be some ideological
convenience in their persistence. On this point, we must consider how the official story
presents a final epoch, which is currently in force. We have, on this reading, eschewed
the idea that “there [is] one uniquely correct meaning of an agency’s constitutive
legislation” and so have moved beyond our Diceyan past.95 As concepts like respectful
deference and agency specialization proliferate, administrative discourse is at pains to
divest itself of the unilateral exercise of judicial power. The same signifiers that animated
the historical search for impartial sites of regulation—e.g., efficiency, discretion, and
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supervision—continue to provoke significant disagreement. The history of ideas in
administrative law fosters a continual distrust of non-judicial actors, buried almost
euphemistically under discussions about appropriate limits for judicial review.
Contextualizing the intellectual development of this regulatory area is not an exercise in
drawing lines from historical ingenuity to present day sophistication but rather in noting
the sameness of conceptual language that was always contingent on its social and
institutional surroundings.
2. Law & Interpretation: Reading Against the Development of Bureaucracy
None of the foregoing ideas exist in a disembodied, observable state. We are
fortunate, then, that the records from which critics and officials draw their trajectories are
uniquely accessible. It is relatively straightforward for judges and other interested parties
to construct a narrative of progress from the textual materials of legality. The
conventional focus on landmark decisions and constitutional theories does, however,
privilege a decidedly elite, judge-centric worldview. In his groundbreaking work on the
origins of the administrative state, H.W. Arthurs suggests that even early work toward
bureaucratic organization was marked by a “convergence of economic interest, ideology,
and intellectual perspective.”96 Those within the legal system have an obvious incentive
to perpetuate some version of the status quo—at least enough to retain their professional
or authoritative monopoly. The result has been a shift in judicial language—“from a
pragmatic to a principled style.”97 By moving stories about jurisprudential development
into the register of external principles, officials have masked the contingency of their
preferred forms of governance. As we have seen, when deemed progress is reduced to
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amorphous concepts, it has profound staying power despite fluctuations in background
conditions.
It is telling, for instance, that the Canadian approach to judicial deference “has no
textual basis in the Constitution, the idea was borrowed from American jurisprudence and
transplanted into the Canadian common law.”98 While this is obvious insofar as no one in
1867 would have predicted our current mechanisms of judicial review, there is rarely
much jurisprudential discussion of its undemocratic construction and adoption. It is
instead presented as an axiomatic foundation of this legal area. Similarly, when we look
back on the trilogy of Nicholson v. Haldimand-Norfolk Police Commissioners, C.U.P.E.
v. New Brunswick Liquor Corp., and Crevier v. Attorney General (Québec), the often
unstated development involves a move to the language of principles. As Lewans puts it,
“instead of conceiving judicial review as a means for ensuring that the legislature,
judiciary, and executive perform distinct constitutional functions, the purpose of judicial
review construed as a means of sustaining fundamental values like procedural fairness.”99
Even where we move to the so-called “pragmatic and functional era” or into modernity
with the Dunsmuir insistence on understated terminology, we remain within an
amorphous linguistic empire.100
This is deeply beneficial to those in power because the relevant structuring
principles are largely atemporal. Certainly, there have been fluctuations in the emphases
placed on, say, deference and reasonableness, but few would ever have explicitly rejected
the lofty promise of “procedural fairness.” In result, sites of interpretation exist largely
without historical grounding despite an implicit promise that they have come forth from a
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long tradition of jurisprudential wisdom.101 When we read legal texts about subjects
interacting with the administrative state, we are presented with records of experience—
the application of principles in everyday life. This requires careful attention because
the evidence of experience, whether conceived through a metaphor of
visibility or in any other way that takes meaning as transparent, reproduces
rather than contests given ideological systems … the project of making
experience visible precludes critical examination of the workings of the
ideological system itself, its categories of representation … its premises
about what these categories mean and how they operate, and of its notions
of subjects, origin, and cause.102
Recounting a history of interpretation is impossible given the individualized and perhaps
incommunicable forces at play, but we can still account for, or at least pay attention to,
institutional inflections and relationships. The critical value in such an undertaking relies
heavily on an ability to discuss historically contingent features of legality without
securing the content called into question. Suggesting that the treatment of concepts like
deference has changed over time runs the risk of implying stability within the signifier
and the institutions that advance it as an organizing ideal.
Those who have traced the intellectual development of Canadian administrative
law note “mixed messages” throughout our case law, but interpretation remains, to my
mind, largely static.103 The turn to principles noted by Arthurs in the 19th century
continues more or less apace; interpretive work is structured around concepts that hold no
inherent meaning. Often, the language remains the same—we may never stop talking in
terms of limits to deference, as though tribunals wait to transgress their statutory
mandates at every turn—but the core process is consistent though hidden. Interpretation
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must necessarily constitute the ascendancy of one textual association over all others. This
does not, however, mean that progress is impossible. A reformative effort must start, as I
have tried to do above, by foregrounding the contingency of sites for interpretation and
the mechanisms for its review. On this newly leveled ground, there is significant promise
in unpacking the theoretical lineage of administrative interpretation. The language of
principles is meant to disappear controversy, but this is ultimately an interpretive
approach borne of significant and self-conscious conflict—one of staking moral claims
and pushing alternative frames of meaning to the margins.
(c.) The External Skeptic, Internalized
The “entire context” of the modern principle is an easy point of criticism. It is a
directive that refers to everything and nothing—and, in practice, to whatever the
decision-maker prefers. 104 This selective application is understandable (even if the
rhetoric behind it is not) since every interpretation must draw a line somewhere. Given
the play of language, one can look endlessly for definitional supplements; almost
anything can impact our (embodied) understandings of signification.105 In administrative
law, this work is delimited through the presence of structuring principles: a tendency that
owes an often unstated debt to the work of Ronald Dworkin.106 While his most famous
text, Law’s Empire, engages deeply with the proper scope of hermeneutical concern,
there are answers to persistent questions of legal meaning throughout his anti-positivist
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corpus. This body of work evinces little concern with administrative law, but instead
seems to speak directly to the core anxieties of its subject matter. For Dworkin, there are
(or, at least, can be) principles that meaningfully constrain discretion and decisionmaking wherever it appears. One critic, building on this interpretive vision, finds
“[a]dministrative law values [which] are immanent in the law.”107 In this way, legal
hermeneutics do not depend on tyrannical discretion but rather upon the operation of
internal commitments that coalesce into the best possible version of legality in any given
dispute. This is, of course, largely a question of ethics, as no one can make a claim to best
practices without a normative end in mind.
The contributions made by Dworkin on this question are highly influential and, to
his credit, rarely shy away from their overtly normative character.108 Beyond his wellknown arguments for interpretation as a matter of “principle” and “integrity,” a more
general turn to principles—the idea that there is something out there that conduces to a
legally sound answer—has been adopted by several contemporary scholars, perhaps most
notably by David Dyzenhaus.109 This approach is not without benefits. There is critical
promise in his insistence that value judgments inhere to every interpretive act, but it also
presumes linguistic stability in a manner that eschews alternative perspectives. Guidance
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is available through principles only when there is agreement on what they mean. To
suggest that a definitional question can be answered through the operation of, say,
“integrity” is simply to defer (and probably complicate) the first-order interpretation. It is
not this simple for Dworkin (although it often is for judges); he recognizes that principles
allow for different readings and operational disagreements.110 In an effort to contextualize
sites of interpretation within the administrative state, however, it is useful to reorient the
question, asking instead about the limits and authorship of these apparently structuring
principles. This issue is taken up in earnest throughout Dworkin’s work on productive
skepticism. His inquiry, like mine in the foregoing section, is about what questions are
properly asked when legal language is construed.
Our jurisprudence is rife with claims to interpretive truth—and, unlike Dworkin,
these judges stop short of the Herculean thought experiment to justify themselves.111
Indeed, the current approach to statutory interpretation is based on the idea that a
definitional answer exists and can be found, concurrently, within and outside the text.112
In his A Matter of Principle, Dworkin suggests that we must be wary of a “rule-book”
conception of law—one where judges “decide hard cases by trying to discover what is
‘really’ in the rule book.”113 This sounds circular, but his point is that “background moral
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rights” should inform a reading of the text over the abstraction of “what the legislation
would have done” had it imagined the relevant situation.114 Legal interpretation of this
sort relies on the “language of objectivity”: In a world replete with subjective tastes, there
is still a space for “genuine” moral claims that search for the “right answer.”115 Again,
this is more nuanced than a simple claim about one true meaning. We can search for an
objective version of truth, but this remains distinct from aesthetic arguments. Dworkin
does not presume that he (or, indeed, anyone) holds the only valid answer to any given
dispute; rather, we “discover” truth when we argue in a productive way.116 In other
words, to become an internal skeptic is to “assume some general and abstract moral
position,” which informs a bounded interpretation of law. 117 Internal skepticism is
“skepticism within the enterprise of interpretation, as a substantive position about the best
interpretation.”118 It involves disagreement about meaning, but never about the possibility
of meaning.
Conversely, the external skeptic is uneasy about truth statements—but, for
Dworkin, pointlessly so. This person is incredulous toward metanarratives; she rejects
“the view that interpretive meanings are ‘out there’ in the universe or that correct legal
decisions are located in some ‘transcendental reality.’” 119 While this seems like an
eminently reasonable position, it becomes a matter of logical consistency. The insidious
external skeptic tries to “have it both ways,” attacking claims to moral truth and
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suggesting that her global skepticism is, itself, true.120 Perhaps most egregiously of all,
this person “attacks our ordinary beliefs because he attributes to us absurd claims we do
not make. We do not say … that interpretation is like physics … We only say, with
different emphases, that Hamlet is about delay and slavery is wrong.”121 Crucially, these
statements are the products of an internal skeptic’s methodology: “The practices of
interpretation and morality give these claims all the meaning they need or could have.”122
In other words, internal skepticism rejects a “positive moral claim” only when justified
by the self-conscious adoption of an incompatible one.123 This is an interpretive approach
deeply amenable to the idea that texts, broadly construed, are all we have—but one that
refuses to see this as a conceptual problem or a rationale for departing from the “language
of objectivity.”124
While Dworkin’s language is unapologetically normative, it should not be read as
blindly monistic.125 His terms, broadly speaking, are ‘ought’ rather than ‘is.’ Indeed, the
interpretive approach advanced in much of his oeuvre, which closely mirrors that found
in our jurisprudence, is inspired at least partially by an awareness of more global
uncertainty. The proliferation of structuring principles in legal hermeneutics can be read
as a response to passive relativism. For Dworkin, external skeptics are useless in their
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lines of inquiry: “They say, of any thesis about the best account of legal practice in some
department of the law, ‘That’s your opinion,’ which is true but to no point.”126 Instead,
since he views “global internal skepticism” as worthless (e.g., the argument that morality
can only ever be drawn from the mores of a given community) and only rhetorically
distinct from external skepticism, Dworkin insists that we make moral claims and argue
for their objective validity.127 On this view, an attack on the stability of language is
worthless since it distracts from the important work of “discovering” the best possible
meaning for every legal text.128
It is hardly difficult to critique this position from a deconstructivist perspective.
The threshold question of who gets to decide what something like ‘best’ means is likely
to render an elite group, with minimal diversity, performing privileged legal heuristics.129
Although there are presumptions of universality throughout Dworkin’s work—his is a
violent brand of hermeneutics, reducing otherness to a single best answer or approach—
there is something undeniably instructive in his demanding interpretive theory. The
insistence that everyone must take a position, that no amount of theoretical abstraction
saves one from the fray of personal bias, remains important for interpretation in a world
of contingent sign associations. My argument here is that Dworkin underestimates the
value of “not-knowing” in relation to external skepticism, but that this does not merit a
wholesale rejection of his analytical rigour. His voice remains important for
understanding the practice of administrative interpretation and review, but it also has the
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potential to mediate between the “language of objectivity” and efforts toward critical
destabilization. Reading Dworkin against his claims to universality raises important
questions about the predictive value of structuring principles, but also facilitates a
grounded self-awareness in poststructuralist legal interpretation. The maligned external
skeptic has important insights to contribute, so long as she lives up to Dworkin’s
challenge of articulating her necessarily politic moral judgments.
The brand of interpretive anti-positivism that has now pervaded judicial discourse
and even mainstream scholarship is concisely summarized as “the requirement that any
relevant legal materials be displayed in their best moral light.”130 One does not search
long for this sentiment in statutory interpretation jurisprudence; in Dunsmuir, for
instance, reviewing agency interpretation is a matter of construing language toward the
simultaneous valorization of the ‘rule of law’ and legislative supremacy.131An external
skeptic would, of course, question the possibility of this enterprise. The ‘rule of law,’ for
instance, is hardly a standalone justification or analytical tool. What, though, is the
benefit to rejecting this rhetorical device and positioning the claim as peremptory and
structural? Dworkin would start by rendering it within his matrix of positive morality—
something like, ‘interpretation should be justified as much as possible through the
articulation of individualized associations and preferences rather than amorphous
principles’—but is still unlikely to find my argument persuasive. The usefulness of this
global uncertainty is not, however, simply in the arguments it produces but rather in the
openness it facilitates. More specifically, unsettling presumptions of linguistic stability is
important if we are to ask, as clearly as possible, ‘who speaks when meaning is in
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dispute?’ When courts impose their definitional will, but act as though they are
“discovering” something out there on the basis of, say, the ‘rule of law,’ they engage in
active misdirection about where the authoritative subject is located.132 If judges are to pen
legally binding chapters in the Dworkinian chain novel of interpretations, then they
should (a normative ‘ought’ statement that would have been familiar to Dworkin) sign
their own names instead of evoking settled law through ethereal principles.
The benefit of external skepticism lies primarily in the questions it asks, rather
than the answers it secures. Acknowledging that problems of communication preclude a
singular “language of objectivity” is not analytically useless, though it does not facilitate
easy interpretive answers.133 When placed in conversation with the idea that one “can’t be
skeptical all the way down,” since skepticism is built “on some positive moral position,”
it becomes even more important to remain distrustful of that which we hold as selfevident.134 I agree with Dworkin that every version of interpretive skepticism is built on a
variety of moral convictions—skepticism is inseparable from the person manifesting it—
but submit that these, too, deserve a healthy measure of doubt. We construe language
without the availability of a metalanguage and therefore cannot verify that our textual
associations align. The complexities of language that give rise to disputes about a
statutory provision remain fully in force when we devise an approach that is built on
words—whether “integrity,” “best practices,” or anything else. Dworkin’s disdain for
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external skepticism is admirable to the extent it keeps him from the nihilism of total
indeterminacy, but our interpretations better reflect the diversity appropriate to a
democratic legal task when we engage with the conditions of “not-knowing.”
Rather than acknowledging the play within the structure of internal skepticism,
legal actors continue to advance “[p]rinciples concerning administrative decision-makers
and the interpretation of legislation.”135 The result is what Dyzenhaus calls a “practiceoriented common law tradition.”136 Interpretation is shaped, on this reading, by a matrix
of internal commitments that gives meaning and structure to our debates about law. Even
the routine claim, whether on first instance or review, that the “express” or “ordinary”
meaning renders something definite depends on “skepticism of the internal kind [that]
must be earned by arguments of the same contested character as the arguments it
opposes.”137 This provides a shared language of interpretive work, but lacks the external
skeptic’s disquiet about the meta-structure of the enterprise. On review, courts assess the
reasonableness of a given definition, usually provided by a tribunal empowered by the
same instrument. They use the same terminology—indeed, our “one principle or
approach” of statutory interpretation demands it138—despite the absence of any clear
definition of what ‘context,’ ‘purpose,’ or ‘intent’ might mean depending on one’s
perspective. Both administrative and judicial decision-makers practice internal skepticism
by advancing a definition that best accords with their sense of the dispositive principles.
External skepticism is unlikely to produce short answers to questions about language, but
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it does reorient the frames through which we view the practice and review of
interpretation.
(d.) Interpretation as Power
Structuring principles provoke far less controversy than claims to an authoritative
perspective. If legal actors engage transparently with the play of language, they must also
become explicit about the power they hold. Someone must have the last definitional word
in a system of textual laws, but this basic implication of linguistic play is obscured behind
the rhetoric of legal interpretation. As a result, when we talk about statutory
interpretation, we often ask the wrong questions. Inquiring into the ‘correct’ or even
‘reasonable’ definition of a given provision misses the larger point because “[t]he
answers will depend on who asks, why they ask, where they ask, and even when they
ask.” 139 The impulse to constrain or impose order upon the interpretive task is an
understandable one, but nothing stable underlies our legal texts. Rules and presumptions
about interpretation simply defer the first-order question; if we cannot define the
legislative provision, then what hope do we have of defining open-ended directives, that
we should read, say, the “entire context” or in the “ordinary and grammatical sense.” The
process of construing legislation must always reduce down to the ascendancy of a single
perspective. This is not fatal to aspirations of democratic decision-making, but
reformative efforts cannot begin before we clarify the problem.
It is rhetorically uncomfortable to admit that a legal definition rests on nothing
more than a subjective sign association. This is exacerbated by the radical implications of
deconstruction in the courtroom: Language that reflects only itself does not facilitate a
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doctrinal solution. While the necessity of legal interpretation and the means of moving
forward will be discussed at length in the final chapter, it is important to remain mindful
of the significant challenges that inhere to this critical project. If the words that constitute
structuring principles and legislative provisions cannot signify beyond their speakers,
then what makes these words any different? The short answer is nothing. Difficulties of
communication cannot, however, result in nihilistic silence when linguistic meaning is
imposed by legal actors everyday. A preliminary step toward understanding the current
regime and advocating for progressive changes involves transparent engagement with the
inherent meaninglessness of language. This fundamentally shifts the dispositive question
from what words should mean to the sites of interpretation themselves. In the absence of
a metalanguage and in a landscape of written texts, we must ask who gets to speak when
meaning is in dispute.
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III. Stories of Interpretation
In his Philosophical Investigations, Ludwig Wittgenstein suggests that every
“picture of reality” is constructed with observable fragments. 140 When we reach
conceptual bedrock, the whole is transformed but the elemental features are irreducible.
He begins to see his chair as legs, a back, etc., but these constituent pieces remain
static.141 Although administrative law is, as a claimed doctrinal area, invisible in its
broadest sense, its operation manifests in a similar way. Like the furniture in
Wittgenstein’s study, this form of regulation presents as the sum of its identifiable parts.
The function of the administrative state—viz., mediating “relationships between the
government and the governed”142—splinters into innumerable contact points that are said
to cohere around foundational precepts like a “deep structure” in our constitution.143 Both
the case law and literature surrounding administrative governance would be virtually
unrecognizable without familiar thematic anchors like deference and expertise. Indeed, as
the foregoing chapter points out, this legal area is uniquely replete with structuring
principles that claim to order the discretion that proliferates. 144 Dialogue about the
bureaucratization of state power can productively begin with a simple question: What do
we talk about when we talk about administrative law?
In one sense, this is an easy question to answer. While an academic database
returns about ten thousand books and articles dealing with this subject in Canada alone
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(to say nothing of the primary sources: the tens of thousands of agency decisions and
judicial reviews),145 some generalizations can (and must) be made.146 This is where a
critical reading of the “picture of reality” becomes illuminating. The work performed on
administrative law as a whole by discrete elements—whether they be institutional
structures, like branches of government, or ideational ones, such as the ubiquitous notion
of decisional respect—is easily discernible (though still highly complex). A more useful
question concerns the act of naming constituent parts. Wittgenstein stops theorizing about
his chair once he sees it as, e.g., legs and a backrest; this does not mean that nothing
underlies those visible components. My interest here is not in subatomic particles but in
the questions of where foundational concepts are claimed (and marked off) and, more
importantly, what if anything exists beneath these surfaces. It is analytically useful to see
administrative law as the product of its animating discourse(s), but the next step inquires
into the irreducible nature of its central preoccupations. Deference to agencies, for
instance, does not exist in an a priori relationship with bureaucracy. Instead, there is a
dominant discourse that shapes our law and, necessarily, a series of omissions and
elisions that justify the current workings of administrative power.147
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Since every limit must imply something beyond it, there is compelling reason to
suspect latent content is left unremarked by the language of administrative law. When
searching for a point of entry into the variegated realm of legal bureaucracy, there is an
understandable impulse to reach for something distinct from the manifest work of boards,
tribunals, and reviewing courts. Those who answer similarly ambitious queries—such as,
‘what is language?’—typically claim “something other than” that which must be
defined.148 In much the same way, judges and critics define administrative law as, inter
alia, a matrix of institutional relationships and contact points between citizens and
government.149 Throughout the case law and literature, there is an impulse to render the
relevant legal area as “something other than” its mechanistic workings. The result is a
discursive field that presents power within a nominally enclosed structure. It advances a
set of signifiers that remain consistent even while their content is fiercely debated. As a
rhetorical overlay in a world of unverifiable signs, it is not just unhelpful—the prevailing
discourse of administrative law obscures the play(s) of power inherent to interpretive
work. Controversy and difference are disappeared behind the privileged vernacular of
legal reasoning.150
The relevant discourse presumes both linguistic stability and the universality of
meaning. This allows empty signifiers like deference and reasonableness to arise without
explanation or supplemental definitions. Structuring principles carry significant
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theoretical baggage while remaining malleable enough to justify any outcome. A word
like deference, for instance, implies its own limits; without more, it means and predicts
very little. Still, these ethereal concepts predominate, owing in no small part to the fact
that “[a]dministrative law, as a discrete area of practice, scholarship, and legal education,
was born in the throes of a legitimacy crisis.”151 Lofty ideals are advanced to explain
away the problems of novel discretion and alternative sites of regulation. In result, the
violence of interpretation—of imposing definitional sense with the threat of force—is
obscured behind the rhetoric of dispassionate legal reasoning. Pulling at the thread of this
linguistic empire reveals a set of malleable discursive conventions that, taken together,
aim to justify the expressions of power in the administrative state. This chapter considers
some of the loudest critical voices in the relevant scholarship to demonstrate the
instability of our governing principles. I begin with the ubiquitous notion of deference as
a stand-in for theses of legitimacy before unpacking the role of specialization and
institutional difference in popular theories of agency interpretation. Finally, I provide a
broadly deconstructive reading of the most pervasive concepts that are said to structure
agency interpretation and review.
(a.) Deferring to Respect: On the Contested Legitimacy of Administrative Governance
In at least one sense, the question of what we talk about when we talk about
administrative law has an obvious answer. We talk, sometimes almost exclusively, about
judicial review.152 Students and critics in this area can readily name the cases that give
content to its doctrinal foundations—conversations and articles abound on, say, CUPE
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and Wilson—but generally fall silent about ground-level application. 153 This runs
contrary to the official self-image of the administrative state; boards and tribunals form
the core of this mode of governance while the judiciary waits at the margins for the
transgression of some outer limit.154 It appears strange, then, that arguments about the
appropriate ordering of administration depends on the idea of deference from the bench
without often giving sustained attention to the first-order question—to what, exactly, do
we defer? The idea is perhaps best put in a recent text by Matthew Lewans: “This
preoccupation generates a hollow conception of administrative law, because it is
portrayed merely as a species of political power that emerges when the law runs out.”155
By visualizing administrative law as that which polices the borders and keeps us safe
from bureaucrats and their paralegal discretion, we construct a discursive field centred on
one half of the classic dichotomy between delegated parliamentary supremacy and the
entrenched supervisory role of the judiciary. When we discuss administrative law, we are
more often than not already declaring a crisis—the limits of agency power have been
invoked and the judiciary prepares to step in.156
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Accordingly, the relevant discourse begins with institutions already in conflict.157
This is an unavoidable implication of self-enclosed governance: It requires both an
administrative core and judicial supervision—and, more significantly, it leaves the
question of scope unanswered.158 As a result, the contours of bureaucratic decisionmaking (and its review) remain hotly contested in the relevant scholarship. While few
critics suggest that either side of the institutional dichotomy should collapse entirely,
barrels of ink have been spilt trying to locate the point at which the judiciary can validly
begin speaking. This is hardly a new phenomenon (the cliché of citing AV Dicey’s
centuries-old incredulity is well-worn on this point), but it continues to take up
considerable critical space.159 It is, in short, a story about deference. Parliament can, of
course, delegate, and it is assumed that the ensuing administrative decisions will survive
some degree of judicial scrutiny or even disagreement; the question, though, is how
much.160 This technical sounding question carries the weight of significant theoretical and
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normative baggage. Deference has become a shorthand for the more abstract issues
surrounding the legitimacy of any adjudicator imposing their interpretation as the final
word; it facilitates an image of cleanly delineated institutional authority without requiring
the speaker to articulate, say, a theory of legitimacy or democratic constitutionalism from
the ground up.161 Simply put, deference functions as a malleable placeholder for the
desired conceptual justification in any given case; it signifies in relation to lofty ideals
about governmental organization without meaning anything in particular. Once again, it
is instructive to consider what lies beneath the surface of this constituent element of
administrative discourse.
Judicial review, whether nominally deferential or not, is inextricably linked to the
practice of statutory interpretation. 162 Within the uniquely grammatical landscape of
administrative law, the contours of discretion and powers of reversal depend (at least in
theory) on the words of enactment.163 Deference is therefore an innocuous sounding
frame for debates about legitimate spheres of authority. This is, after all, a story about
linguistic superiority despite unverifiable meaning. Behind the “variability project” of
interpreting under the threat of review lies an inescapable approach/avoidance
proposition—the paradoxical search for enforcement and restraint.164 The act of judicial
forbearance attracts the most sustained critical and judicial attention despite its acute lack
of signifying power; indeed, this is an area with a direct nexus between the academy and
161
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doctrinal development.165 Although the term itself is an empty demarcation point between
institutions claiming definitional content, deference is a convenient rhetorical device for
advancing any given iteration of legitimate authority. It suggests liminality by invoking a
protected core and an active supervisor who either defers or does not—but, in either case,
acts on the basis of awareness and, on most accounts, privileged legal enlightenment.166
As a result, the discourse surrounding the legitimacy of speaking to contested meaning
masks the operation of institutional authority behind the play of ‘deference’ as a
foundational structure.
1. Delimiting the “Culture of Justification”
Despite its relatively advanced age, an oft-cited article from David Dyzenhaus,
“The Politics of Deference: Judicial Review and Democracy,” has been proffered
repeatedly by the Supreme Court as an ideal image of judicial review.167 While the
invocation of scholarly authority is not, in itself, especially uncommon, Dyzenhaus
receives more than passing reference for legitimizing purposes: His phrase, “deference as
respect,” has entered the legal vernacular and is now cited routinely in trial and appellate
courts alike.168 In essence, its jurisprudential impact has been the nominal adoption of “a
respectful attention to the reasons offered or which could be offered in support of a
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decision.”169 His thesis of legitimacy—a “theory of democratic legal order”—relies on
the well-known mandate that courts pay respectful attention to administrative
reasoning.170 Throughout this argument, and the numerous comments it inspires, is an
abiding faith in the stability of language. Institutions can exist as “strands in a web of
public justification” because that structure is communicable;171 even if we disagree on the
geographical validity of a given strand, there is a field of debate—an anti-positivist space
for declaring best practices—where interpretations (and their review) can be openly
advanced and defended. This is a pervasive aphorism in administrative discourse, and one
that is intimately connected to both the process and rhetoric of construing language in this
area of the law.
On this prevailing view of institutional legitimacy, whereby courts defer via
respectful attention to agencies and their reasoning, Dyzenhaus makes an important
distinction between respect and submission. The latter, he suggests, is the dictionary
meaning of deference, but one that is incompatible with the “legal culture of justification”
he imagines.172 Courts enjoy considerable power and should, on the mainstream view,
exercise restraint in their oversight of agency decision-making. This leads to a proposed
threshold consideration: Legitimate deference is actualized where judges construe
legislation “in terms of the reasons that best justify having [it] … More precisely, they
have to take the tribunal’s reasoning seriously because what they are primarily concerned
to do is to find the reasons that best justify any decision, whether legislative,
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administrative or judicial.”173 We have, then, a unifying theory of institutional claim
spaces. When meaning is in dispute, courts will consider the best reasons for a given
definition before contemplating reversal. For administrative decision-makers, their
reasoning is taken “seriously” to the extent it corresponds with the best available
justification. This is positioned as a move beyond the shadow of Dicey; respectful
deference accepts that judges can never free themselves from the necessity of
interpretation, whether framed as deference, substantive evaluation, or something else.174
The idea here is to open space for alternative answers to how texts signify.
This approach produces the aforementioned “paradox of deference.”
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the courts)—what is the “best” justification for a given definition? This is not an
admission that language can mean wildly different things to different people based on
their psycholinguistic constitution; rather, “deference as respect” carves out a space for a
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decision-maker to speak unilaterally about how texts signify.176 The pertinent question,
then, is not whether a given interpretation is legitimate—that is virtually impossible to
answer in the absence of a metalanguage—but rather one of authoritative positioning.
Since the “best” justification for a statute or a decision depends entirely on one’s
perspective,177 the “paradox of deference” is resolved when we reorient the debate by
asking who gets to speak when meaning is in dispute.
This question has a familiar doctrinal basis. When we talk about legitimacy in
terms of judicial review, the focus is generally on whether “power is justified as law.”178
Judges who adopt the prevailing “deference as respect” model “must examine the reasons
that justify decisions to ensure that they can be law.”179 While there is an ongoing
preoccupation with who appropriately speaks to statutory meaning—whether framed in
terms of jurisdiction or the limits of respectful deference—there is a point at which the
discourse falls silent. It is uncontroversial that legal interpretation is an exercise in
justifying a particular reading, but there is a pervasive assumption that a stable
perspective exists for the purposes of evaluation.180 The very idea of finding the “best”
justification depends on some “intrinsic qualities that give law its authority”—otherwise

176

When judges uphold an administrator’s interpretation based on a conventional rationale for deference
(e.g., expertise), there is not generally much engagement with what the text could have meant. In Edmonton
(City) v Edmonton East (Capilano) Shopping Centres Ltd, 2016 SCC 47, for instance, the Court indicates
that expertise hews to the task to interpreting the home statute and that “the presumption of reasonableness
had not been rebutted.” This is about the board being able to unilaterally impose their definitional sense—
which seems only tangentially related to the idea that language can signify throughout a “range” of possible
meanings [Capilano].
177
There is no universal meaning of ‘best’ and, even if there was, it would be results-oriented, which would
also produce considerable variance.
178
Mark Walters, “Respecting Deference as Respect: Rights, Reasonableness and Proportionality in
Canadian Administrative Law” (2015) Queen’s University Faculty of Law Research Paper Series No 2015002 at 20 [“Respecting Deference”].
179
Ibid.
180
See, e.g., Paul Daly, “The Struggle for Deference in Canada” in Hanna Wilberg & Mark Elliott, eds, The
Scope and Intensity of Substantive Review: Traversing Taggart’s Rainbow (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2015).

59

the assessment depends on the goals and perspective of the final decision-maker.181
Reference points proliferate; one critic argues, borrowing language from Supreme Court
jurisprudence, that, so long as the tribunal’s reasoning is “transparent, intelligible, and
justifiable as well as demonstrably ‘alert, alive, and sensitive” to the interests of the
claimants,” then the decision would seem to be on solid footing.”182 Unsettling the
presumed stability of language therefore has profound implications for the law and
discourse surrounding administrative interpretation.
When reduced to the bare signifiers that make up the argument, it appears
relatively obvious that something like ‘intelligible’ is as value laden as simply trying to
find the ‘best’ rationale. Although there is a growing awareness that administrative law is
uniquely replete with the rhetoric of principled development, 183 this is not a new
phenomenon. Deference became a matter of respect when Dyzenhaus sought to elaborate
on a signifier that, on its own, means nothing. When respect, in turn, becomes a matter of
listening to the best justification that might be offered, which must subsequently be
elaborated into a culture that is later viewed as “a set of values,”184 it becomes easy to see
the exponential dispersion of language’s empire. The question of who gets to decide what
constitutes the best justification for a given textual association refocuses the discourse
about legitimate decisional authority, but it also brings out the subjective nature of the
conversation.185 By looking at the oldest cliché in administrative scholarship in a new
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light, the ways in which we use the same words to talk past each other become clear,
leaving a single question: Who will impose their embodied perception of how language
signifies?
2. The Freudian Dream of Interiority; Or, Dicey’s Mom
Albert Venn Dicey might have benefited from some form of therapy. Certainly,
his feelings about women186 and, to a lesser degree, unions187 are worthy candidates for
psychological exploration. Administrative law scholarship has, however, largely ignored
his troubling views. This is probably due largely to the lack of incentive for orthodox
theorists to redeem or contextualize the figure of Dicey, who has figured mostly as a
caricature in the discourse surrounding administrative legitimacy. Indeed, such
conservative views fit nicely with the general treatment of his famous Introduction to the
Study of the Law of the Constitution.188 For the purposes of passing reference in an
administrative law textbook, it is enough to observe that, for him, “‘courts’ closely
associated with the executive … did not provide citizens with adequate protection against
the executive, for which a truly ‘independent’ judiciary was necessary.”189 This provides
an instructive contrast and advances a story of progress: We were previously hostile
toward administrative governance, but now we exist in an epoch more tolerant of
institutional difference. His views are those of an unenlightened past, serving as a
historical warning about undue rigidity regarding the conceptual status of the executive
and adjudicative impartiality.
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Notably, the language in Dicey is essentially the same as that of his detractors.
While increasingly sympathetic readings of his work have appeared in the past several
years, 190 both sides of the argument share a presumption that their words signify
interpersonally—that Parliamentary supremacy, for instance, can be discussed without
prior definition. By positioning the constituent elements of administrative law as though
they have universal content, proponents of a given theory of legitimacy can interrupt
critical scrutiny. It remains important to take an atomistic look at what we talk about
when we talk about administrative law—or, more precisely, where we stop talking and
presume the stability of our concepts. Turning back to the idea of psychoanalytic benefits,
a subversion of the Diceyan trope, whereby his famous Law of the Constitution is the
subject of a Freudian reading, brings out the persistent interiority that characterizes the
relevant literature. 191 The goal here is to move from an isolated assessment of his
constituent terms to uncover “the internal relations between the thoughts which linked
them together.” 192 This exemplifies the relational character of our reasoning about
administrative law and legitimacy. The popular assumption that we mean the same things
when we use the same signifiers can be shown to be false if consistent terms can justify
inconsistent conclusions. Reviving the caricature of Dicey by placing him on Freud’s
couch is a useful case study in how the elements of administrative discourse signify only
in relation to each other. First, however, it is important to more carefully define my
understanding of interiority as it relates to the interpreting subject.
190
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(i.) Mirrors & Reflections: Embodied Discourse on the Administrative State
There is an internal logic in theories of administrative legitimacy. In part, this is
because concepts are defined by their limits and, so, there can be no proper scope of
judicial review without an image of illegitimate supremacy.193 Much like other forms of
reasoning, engaging with statutory interpretation requires us to a build a theoretical
foundation.194 Ideas of authorship and textuality work together, consciously or not, to
produce a method for understanding legislation. Administrative law is a unique space for
this process, since it embodies (at least nominally) a range of theoretical commitments.
This is an area of the law with a series of structuring principles relevant to interpretation
and its review: Parliamentary intent, judicial deference, and statutory familiarity, among
many others, are the materials we use to understand bureaucratic governance. While these
concepts are not stable or exempt from the problems of communication, they do function
in relation to each other within individual arguments—they “take [their] colour from
context.”195 Consider, for instance, the ubiquitous fiction of Parliamentary intent. This
can signify in relation to deference and expertise in a variety of ways: It might justify a
hands-off approach from the bench on matters that have been delegated, or it could
facilitate a move away from the words of delegation if a contrary motive can be
asserted.196 In the course of arguing about administrative interpretation, we often presume
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that we mean the same thing when we use the same words, but the most popular
structuring principles can mean profoundly different things depending on one’s
perspective.
While this undoubtedly complicates any theorizing about administrative
interpretation and review, it also clarifies the extent to which we reside within a field of
language when we advance a preferred iteration of institutional authority. Given the lack
of universality embodied in linguistic signs, it is perhaps unsurprising that statutory
interpretation must eventually lead to a consideration of individual decision-makers.
However good their intentions may be (and however one might define that word), there is
very little in a legislative instrument to constrain its interpretation. This also reflects the
status of macrocosmic structuring principles. We can supplement a provision with
additional concepts, but those signifiers will be no less vulnerable to the indeterminacy of
language. The question of who gets to speak when meaning is in dispute becomes
virtually dispositive on this reading, but it is also complicated by the layers of potential
forbearance or review in administrative interpretation, along with the potential impacts of
the legislative instruments themselves.
Even if interpretive work is wholly individualized, the words and formation of the
statute still form the stimuli that give rise to the analysis. Readers of Canadian law will
also note a degree of sameness in the relevant decisions. Reference points like “ordinary
meaning” and citations of administrative expertise recur throughout the literature and
jurisprudence; whether or not this is empty rhetoric, there are clearly institutional factors
at play in interpretive work. My interest in who gets to decide as a central question in
statutory interpretation includes the extent to which the answer is informed by how the
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speaking subject is positioned within the administrative state. It is therefore helpful to
begin by clearing the conceptual space of the rhetoric that serves only to mask the play(s)
of power in agency interpretation and review. Freudian theory is helpful here as it insists
on

internal

relations

that

are

shaped

by

social

forces

while

remaining

individualized/unconscious. 197 Legal interpretation is presented as the outcome of
governmental ordering—sites of interpretation are carved out by the state and resonate
beyond the decision-maker. These communal forces cannot, however, provide stability to
the language which must be interpreted. When we account for the interpreting subject
within the law of interpretation—here, by way of oneiric detour—the extent to which
language hides the operation of power becomes manifest.
(ii.) Dream-Work
In his speculative account of Freud’s law career, Charles Yablon notes an
enduring preoccupation with “the relationship between individuals and societal
institutions.”198 The governed subject experiences a mediated reality, one that represses
her desires while presenting a neutral slate of decisional authority.199 This is particularly
apposite in discussions about the administrative state, given its manifest concern with
citizen/government interactions. 200 While there is significant critical potential in the
recognition “that society has an unconscious and formative effect on individual
experience and perception of oneself and others,” it provides a uniquely instructive lens
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for considering the discourse of interpretive legitimacy.201 There is nothing preordained
about the concepts advanced as foundational in this mode of regulation; rather, ideas like
deference and statutory familiarity obscure the domination inherent in every authoritative
claim to definitional truth. The signifiers that make up the field of legal interpretation
work in relation to each other but without a fixed point of departure. Within the
interpreting subject, material is “largely divested of its logical relations ... while at the
same time displacements of intensity among its elements necessarily bring about a
psychical transvaluation of this material. ... [I]t is a matter of displacement along a chain
of associations.”202 This is brought into relief when we consider the relational chain in the
Law of the Constitution.
While Dicey’s faith in the judiciary has not aged well, his distrust of the
administrative state is still understandable when one considers his terms. Indeed, few
would argue that his description of droit administratif sounds like a promising approach
for governmental organization. Early in his famous discussion on the subject, Dicey
grounds his opposition in the special treatment of state officials, “or, as we say in
England, of the Crown, who, whilst acting in pursuance of official orders … are guilty of
acts which are wrongful or unlawful.” 203 The obvious counterargument is that this
rendering of bureaucracy betrays a conservatism of thought. Dicey is, after all, fairly rigid
in his denunciation of “this protection” despite its nonessential character.204 There is,
however, a sense of linguistic care throughout the Law of the Constitution, and one that
201
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gestures toward a conceptual overview: “This absence from our language of any
satisfactory equivalent for the expression droit administratif is significant; the want of a
name arises at bottom from our non-recognition of the thing itself.”205 Throughout his
argument, there are claims to democratic expectations (that “Englishmen” reject
administrative governance) and warnings about populist calls to abrogate judicial checks
on state power.206 Both arguments would likely receive general assent today so long as
the relevant terms remained consistent. At a high level of generality, we see Dicey rally
against the administrative state, but his discrete moves are defensible for non-Napoleonic
theorists. Once again, our assumed differences reduce down to questions about how we
define our constituent terms—or, ultimately, to questions of language.
Dicey’s argument is strong because his positions are obvious. He rejects special
treatment for state actors, blatant transgressions of the popular will, and authoritarian
limits on the availability of judicial review. In the process, of course, he rejects what he
understands as droit administratif, which tells us something important about the
malleability of constituent elements. Here, it becomes useful to render what Freud called
the “[i]nternal, organic somatic stimulus” of administrative aversion in the Law of the
Constitution. 207 The fundamental concern is one of unchecked discretion whereby
“judges are the enemies of the servants of the State.”208 There is an underlying theory of
legitimacy here: One can disagree with Dicey’s understanding of the judicial function,
but if we take his argument on its own terms, it largely makes sense. If, as he suggests,
“[t]he administrative law of to-day has been built up on the foundations laid by
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Napoleon”—and, further, there is a locus of proved restraint and impartiality on the
bench—then of course the addition of bureaucratic regulation is undesirable.209 This is
not to suggest a passive form of relativism that accepts any argument based on
counterfactual content (like the transcendent wisdom of the judiciary posited in Dicey’s
work) but rather a means of understanding the play in the constituent structures of
administrative law.
I have no particular interest in presenting a sympathetic reading of the Law of the
Constitution. Instead, as Jacques Lacan describes the Freudian project, I hope to bring out
“the analytic situation, which, within the four walls that limit its field, can do very well
without people knowing which way is north.”210 In other words, signs are interpreted
according to the inner logic of the interpreting subject. Dicey presents a matrix of familiar
structuring principles that presents as outdated but signifies persuasively according to its
internal logic. There is nothing stable within the signifiers he advances, but each concept
takes meaning from its surroundings. 211 When he draws on, say, Parliamentary
supremacy, it stands as a marker of democratic representation; otherwise, “they would
cease to be a House of Commons.”212 This, in turn, informs his understanding of the
separation of powers. Since the legislature is the institutional placeholder for English
subjects, “[t]here is no law which Parliament cannot change.”213 Understandably, if these
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laws are to be written, we must cede interpretive authority to someone, and his suggestion
is the judiciary.214
The mutually informing nature of his signifiers reaches an apex where he
concludes on the administrative state and the ‘rule of law,’ suggesting that the “executive
needs therefore the right to exercise discretionary powers, but the Court must prevent,
and will prevent where personal liberty is concerned, the exercise by the government of
any sort of discretionary power.”215 While this reads as more of the judicial supremacy
typically attributed to him, Dicey is rehearsing the same push/pull of self-enclosed
governance that continues to provoke discussion and debate. For him, the fulcrum is
“ordinary law” and anything beyond its contours should be disallowed.216 This, of course,
is an empty signifier, but no more so than “deference as respect.” The point is that
administrative law discourse often relies heavily on interlocking metanarratives. In the
Law of the Constitution, we find judges who have access to privileged heuristics and
governmental actors whose only role is to reflect that which is “common”—the
democratic will of the people.217 The result is an argument for a conservative distribution
of interpretive authority. Conversely, arguments that find value in tribunal specialization
draw the lines of permissible discretion to favour (what they understand as) deference.
When structuring principles are advanced for a theory of interpretive legitimacy, they rely
on the words around them in a manner roughly analogous to Freudian dream logic.
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Interiority is both a difficult and important concept for parsing the relevant
literature. While we do not have privileged access to anyone’s cognitive processes, it
remains instructive to consider the metanarratives surrounding interpretation within their
internal matrices. On this point, it is useful to recall Theodor Adorno’s use of Hegelian
limits, so “that whenever we identify a limit to our knowledge, we already place
ourselves beyond that limit just by identifying the limiting factor and so bringing it within
our compass.”218 As a result, our signifiers are in constant internal flux and “whenever I
grasp an object as non-identical with the concept(s) under which I have approached it, I
become compelled to revise my concept(s) so as to try again to know, to classify, the
elusive object.” 219 This approach is one of “constellations” between that which we
understand and that which is unfamiliar—a process in a constant state of revision. As we
begin to engage with the linguistic foundations of administrative governance, this form of
discovery is essential for identifying the presumed areas of stability and reading against
them. 220 Interpretive authority is presented as a structured exercise that transcends
individual actors and, as a result, the power of imposing definitional sense is never held
to account. When we talk about administrative law, we too often talk as though its
constituent parts signify sensibly in isolation. While presenting the internal logic of a
given argument does not transcend the problems of communication, it provides a
preliminary step for engaging with the epistemic limits of the interpretive project. By
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emphasizing the interiority of the relevant discourse, we foreground the central place of
the speaking subject when meaning is in dispute.
(b.) Beyond the Courtroom: Readers, Texts, & Institutional Difference
Stories about agency interpretation insist on institutional difference. The
administrative state is not simply about providing a more efficient courtroom experience;
rather, the diverse contexts of specialized regulation promise something more. Both
judges and theorists rationalize deference, at least in part, on the basis of things like
statutory familiarity and greater proximity to those affected by governmental action.221 It
is said, then, that these decision-makers stand in a better position to construe the language
that enables them. When we talk about administrative law, it often generates an
intuitively persuasive argument in favour of agency interpretation. Unlike generalist
judges, agency decision-makers spend their entire professional lives focusing on a single
legislative scheme. They deal with the words themselves in great depth, but also with the
people who seek access to the benefits conferred.222 While agencies have, on average,
less formal legal training than traditional adjudicators, they have a far smaller scope of
concern. The relative weight that should be afforded to these institutional factors is,
however, a matter of some disagreement.223 As critics argue over the bases for agency
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interpretation and its limits, they begin to articulate an understanding of language—one
that tells us how provisions should be construed in the administrative state.
There is broad assent in both law and scholarship that tribunals will often be owed
respect when they interpret their home statute, but different people draw the lines of
institutional competence in different ways. Two broad considerations predominate. On
one hand, when meaning is in dispute, it is defensible to let agencies speak based on their
statutory familiarity; on the other, if we give content to the law of statutory interpretation
(and, unfortunately, most critics still do), judges are better positioned to distil, say,
‘legislative intent’ or ‘ordinary grammar.’224 I have argued elsewhere that our legal tools
for construing language are vacuous rhetoric, incapable of structuring the interpretive
process, and that tribunals are, if anything, more inclined to turn to legal maxims in an
effort to define a provision. 225 While the disconnect between rhetoric and action is
instructive, my interest here is in the theoretical bases for interpretive authority.
Whenever someone argues about the appropriate institutional locus of linguistic meaning,
they articulate a theory of interpretation. If things like specialization and proximity
militate in favour of agency hermeneutics, then we accept a connection between
repetitious exposure to words and validly defining them. In other words, asking what
underlies our claims to expertise reframes the question: When meaning is in dispute, why
should one institution speak over another—and, more precisely, what does this say about
our theories of linguistic meaning?
224
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The administrative state disperses the ability to define legislation, but does so
based on under-examined premises about adjudicative positioning. Institutional
difference is, at once, a promising and incoherent answer to who should interpret with the
force of law. While the “range” of legitimate answers hints toward progress—an epoch
willing to engage with the individualized aspects of construing language—the persistent
rhetoric of definitional accuracy is largely incompatible with contemporary
understandings of language.226 The idea that sustained exposure to a statutory instrument
leads to better interpretations seems compelling, but we rarely pause to ask what lies
beneath these arguments. Administrative discourse presumes the possibility of
interpretive expertise, but rarely make the connection between specialization and
linguistic meaning explicit. 227 My argument, that this ideal of the learned tribunal
obscures the singularity of interpretation, is divided into three parts. First, I consider the
possibility of hermeneutical expertise in relation to the stated goals of statutory
interpretation. Secondly, I place my conclusion—that no one can become an expert in
how language signifies—in conversation with the prevailing images of institutional
difference. This subset of the literature is broadly deferential to agency hermeneutics;
however, accepting the official image of contingent, specialized authority makes it far
easier for judicial review to impose a preferred definition. The limits of interpretive
expertise are easily manipulated. Finally, I demonstrate how the presumed stability of
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language masks the ideological components of construing language in the administrative
state.
1. Hermeneutical Expertise: The Theory & Practice of Defensible Interpretation
An understanding of institutional competence as a rationale for authority requires
at least a provisional theory of interpretive legitimacy. The possibility of hermeneutical
expertise depends on whether one is concerned with words or outcomes. This is a tenuous
(and hardly watertight) distinction, but one that provides some preliminary scaffolding
for the point at issue.228 Consider, for instance, the claims made in an amicus brief by a
group of American linguists:
We are a group of scientific experts authorized by our professional
discipline. We do not take a position on the effect of the Court's decision
on the parties before it. … However, we care deeply about adverbial
syntax, and about what other courts have said and what this Court may say
about syntax in the course of reaching and explaining its decision here. As
experts, we seek to address the theory of interpreting statutory language
that the Court will employ and articulate in this case. On arguments
concerning what knowingly means here, insofar as they are about ordinary
language and syntax, we can speak better than anyone else.229
While the absence of legal linguists in our courts reflects the success this argument
enjoyed, their overarching claim is instructively transparent. It is, in short, one of
privileged knowledge at the level of language. Despite my conviction that linguists would
improve the law of statutory interpretation (insofar as the “modern principle” would be
mercifully put to rest), 230 I disagree with the possibility of “speak[ing] better” on
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“ordinary language and syntax.” Whether or not one is conversant with, say, the adverbial
compatibility with clitic dislocation, the speaking subject does not, by virtue of her
linguistic expertise, enter into a metadiscursive sphere of universality.231 A systematized
study of common grammar does not provide hierarchical knowledge about how textual
associations are forged for individual readers.
All of this begs for a definition of interpretation’s goal. According to Ruth
Sullivan, “[t]o determine the legally correct meaning of a legislative text, the courts begin
by trying to establish its ordinary meaning.”232 Thereafter, judges consider legislative
intent and ensure the meaning is “plausible.” 233 The vacuity of these directives
necessitates a further inquiry: What is ordinary meaning and how does it relate to what
Parliament meant? In practice, it involves constant recourse to the will of the legislature,
as evidenced by the seemingly determinative impact of the context of the enactment,
broadly defined.234 This reading has the further advantage of reflecting a traditional
image of the separation of powers—something judges seem to prefer, given their explicit
distinction between finding and constructing meaning.235 What, then, is the advantage of
linguistic expertise? The answer depends, at least initially, on how one conceptualizes the
authorship of legislation.
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For most theorists and even judges, legislative intent is a self-conscious fiction. It
is an easy target for critical incredulity, not least because of the outdated nature of
interpreting in light of an author’s beliefs or experiences.236 Still, statutes are distinct
from belletristic literature, however lofty their preambular clauses become; as such, an
abiding interest in legislative authorship is potentially defensible. If, as legal actors often
claim, statutory interpretation is about giving effect to the wishes of Parliament,
consonant with the “ordinary” sense of the words used, there must be some implicit
notion of the authorial subject who intends something. That locus of intentionality might
ultimately be the provision itself; after all, the text is the subject of democratic debate and
eventual assent, which is necessarily communal. It is almost trite to observe that different
Members will have different motives for—and even understandings of—the legislation
for which they vote.237 Other possibilities include a search for what the drafters intended
or an explicit delegation to adjudicators to impose their sense of an ‘ordinary’ meaning.
These disparate alternatives are united by their incompatibility with linguistic
expertise. If the aim of interpretation is to distil something from language—whether the
‘ordinary’ meaning, what somebody intended, or virtually anything else residing within
the text—then these experts must explain their ability to impose a uniquely valid
association between texts and competing definitions. More starkly, what does linguistic
expertise add to the search for interpretive accuracy, as defined by the goals of construing
provisions in a democratic legal order? The answer, I think, is not much. If we imagine
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the counterfactual presence of linguists in the courtroom, using their privileged
knowledge about general usage and syntax to answer questions of interpretation, we run
into serious problems concerning the nature of legislation.238 At the highest level of
abstraction, it is important to recall the deconstructivist critique here: We cannot know
how texts signify to other people, so even if we understand common sign patterns, this
tells us nothing about the internal associations forged by each subject. We can, in short,
use the same words to talk past each other. Closer to the ground, those who advance
institutional positioning as a means of better defining the home statute must articulate an
endgame. A linguistic expert might have better insights into the function of grammar—
how certain words and phrases might indicate intent—but decoding the drafters’
rhetorical goals does not provide a means of construing something as communal as
legislation. If it takes special knowledge about grammar to determine the intent of the
author, then that cannot be presumed as the content for which individual Members of
Parliament voted. Linguistic expertise has a variety of uses, but providing a privileged
means of reading legislation is not one of them.
Administrators are not trained as linguists. The foregoing critique applies even
more forcefully to their deemed expertise, which consists of reading the same statute
repeatedly. There is, however, a second subset of specialization—one of consequences
rather than bare words. State actors who administer a service have a unique perspective
on how it impacts citizens. There is some jurisprudential ambivalence on this point;
something akin to policy expertise is implicit in much of the case law, but judges cannot
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openly admit to the lack of constraint imposed by statutory language.239 In the Georgia
Strait Alliance v. Canada (Minister of Fisheries and Oceans) decision, for instance, the
Federal Court of Appeal held that “[e]xpertise in fisheries does not necessarily confer
special legal expertise to interpret the statutory provisions of the SARA or of the Fisheries
Act.”240 Holding otherwise would be something of a Diceyan nightmare, as it would
allow tribunals to transgress textual directives in favour of “particular expertise and
experiences” that arise from institutional positioning. 241 Tribunal policy-making is
inevitable given the vacuity of our interpretive laws, but there is a decided
approach/avoidance attitude to this form of expertise as an explicit postulate of the
administrative state. It is, after all, fundamentally incompatible with the idea of found
meaning in a legislative instrument.242
Institutional difference is inseparable from most aspirational accounts of agency
interpretation. Clearly, texts are being construed outside of courtrooms, and this is
presumed to impact the results in a variety of ways. The oft-cited indicia of this
difference—some combination of schematic familiarity, proximity to those affected, and
technical knowledge on points of particular complexity—undoubtedly influence the
definitions that arise from the administrative state. My claim here is simply that no one
can be an expert in how language signifies. We are constituted by a matrix of signs that
cannot be straightforwardly communicated in a verifiable way; textual associations are
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largely unknowable absent a metalanguage. Linguistic competence is ultimately
unhelpful in the task of interpreting statutes because there is no grammatical insight that
provides a privileged reading of a text.243 When we talk about administrative law in terms
of institutional difference, we presume some specialized ability to determine democratic
meaning, but we rarely ask how the features of bureaucracy impact the interpretive
process. It is therefore important to turn to the literature to parse the supposed benefits of
administrative bodies speaking when meaning is in dispute.
2. Opening Space with Abnegation
While most administrative law scholars advocate for some form of deference,
Adrian Vermeule has authored a body of work that celebrates institutional difference
using quasi-enlightenment language. As judges retreat to the margins, ready to step in
where agencies transgress broad delegated limits, the law is “working itself pure” by
following its “own criteria.”244 Writing in the American context, Vermeule argues that
“the Constitution superseded itself from within,” that delegation of authority is an
essential component of modern regulation.245 This argument has significant ramifications
for adjudicative legitimacy in a broad sense, but accepting it raises a specific question
about interpretation: How should we conceptualize the space left by judges, and ceded to
administrators, on points of linguistic meaning? In Law’s Abnegation, he follows a
critical trend such that agencies should be seen as choosing between competing
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definitions within a “policy space,” essentially picking one in a “range of … reasonable
interpretations.” 246 Sometimes, he suggests, only one answer will be reasonable.
Otherwise, choice persists and language can be defined explicitly in relation to policy
outcomes.247 At a certain point, tribunals need to decide on a singular definition and
rendering further explanations simply becomes “pathological.”248 The core interpretive
idea here seems to point directly back to results-oriented expertise—an issue taken up in
earnest by the first-wave legal realists.
Although he was far from alone, Karl Llewellyn was explicit about his disdain for
the law of statutory interpretation. By his reading, the presumptions that underwrite legal
definitions are simply “thrusts” and “parries.”249 They are used selectively based on a
preferred result and, taken together, simply cancel each other out. Judges are not
constrained by these rules, and nor could agencies be. Interpretive questions, then, are
always already in the policy sphere. This sentiment is largely echoed in John Willis’s
influential “Three Approaches to Administrative Law.” He argues that “there is no reason
to distinguish in administrative law between questions of policy and questions of law.”250
We should focus instead on effecting a vision of the public good.251 This broad concern,
which has been instrumental in the development of administrative regulation, has distinct
implications for how we understand interpretive roles. As the relevant law and discourse
began to take shape, “left-leaning scholars were deeply resentful of what they saw as
conservative judges twisting the pliable rules of statutory interpretation to favour the
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existing order, privileging the rich … and defeating the purposes of statutes intended to
further the interests of the workers, the homeless, and the least well-off in society.”252
The distinct positioning of administrative bodies arguably embodies progressive potential
based on overt concerns with legislative outcomes. We return to that which is prohibited
by the law of statutory interpretation—prioritizing outcomes over empty gestures to
language.
The relevant discourse has, at least by implication, advanced a meaningful role for
institutional difference. By interacting directly with those affected by a governmental
scheme, agencies can interpret with the end in mind—and potentially effect positive
outcomes. A major difficulty, however, lies in trying to define these terms. Many of the
early proponents of administrative regulation rallied against judicial bias, but there is no
assurance that administrative decision-makers will be less conservative in their
distributive choices.253 Even an agency working in earnest to improve its services is still
made-up of embodied subjects who have no uniquely transcendent information about
how a given definition will impact the lived experiences of someone else. Returning to
the central question here—how features of institutional difference impact the construction
of language—the functional answer depends on how closely one holds to the comforting
idea of legislated constraint. If the argument is that agency specialization produces skill at
the level of communal signification, then there is nothing useful being advanced. There is
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no ‘correct’ sign association at the level of language and, so, becoming an expert on this
point is nonsensical. If, however, non-traditional sites of interpretation invite greater
transparency at the level of political decision-making, then the “bureaucratization of
everyday life” is a potentially promising development in the law of interpretation.254
3. Amorphous Expertise
There is a significant, yet eminently understandable problem in the discourse
surrounding institutional difference. Whether one uses the language of expertise,
proximity, or something else to refer to the unique relationship between agencies and
their subject matter, there is rarely much discussion of analytical content. In Edmonton
(City) v. Edmonton East (Capilano) Shopping Centres Ltd, for instance, the Court
endorses the expertise of a “specialized tribunal,” but says little of substance about how
this perspective operates on statutory meaning. The closest that Karakatsanis J, writing
for the majority, gets is to hold that “[e]xpertise arises from the specialization of
functions of administrative tribunals like the Board which have a habitual familiarity with
the legislative scheme they administer.”255 This problem—that surely we mean something
more ambitious than ‘habit’ when institutional difference is invoked—makes a degree of
sense when one considers the source. As one critic puts it, despite the discourse of
administrative expansion, “in the common law system, judges at base still consider
themselves to be the bulwarks against Leviathan.”256 There is no incentive for judges to
vest a form of conceptual authority in agencies that they themselves cannot hold,
particularly since the mere evocation of expertise amply serves their rhetorical needs. The
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relevant jurisprudence provides a malleable image of institutional difference based on
self-interest, which opens space for critical voices to give content to the allowance that
tribunals construe legislation in a distinct way.
In most discussions, administrative expertise reads as a legal euphemism. There
are several possible reasons for recognizing specialized interpretations, but they all lead
to an uncomfortable resolution. Tribunals exist in greater proximity to those affected by a
legislative scheme. They also enjoy routine exposure to their empowering legislation and
presumably have a strong grasp on complex delegated subject matter. What is left unsaid
is that none of these rationales have much to do with the words of the enactment. The
prevailing image of self-enclosed governance is jeopardized by this suggestive departure
from textual guidance. As is often the case, the American literature on this point is more
explicit, but makes the point concisely: There is a burgeoning theme in the development
of judicial review that reflects “the Court majority’s increasing worries about the
politicization of administrative expertise.”257 Legal actors appear unwilling to depart from
the impossible ideal of transcendent adjudicative impartiality, so a response is found in
“the attempt by courts to ensure that agencies exercise expert judgment free from outside
political pressures.” 258 The problem is that expertise divorced from political value
judgments (even if such a thing were possible) leaves a hollow shell, useful only for
rhetorical justifications. If something like proximity to legislative consequences changes
the way a provision is read, then any pretense that those words embody fixed content
must be dropped. Contrary to how that might sound, this is a decidedly optimistic point
for the status of institutional difference.
257

Jody Freeman & Adrian Vermeule, “Massachusetts v EPA: From Politics to Expertise” (2007) SCR 51
at 52.
258
Ibid.

83

The political nature of the administrative state can be traced back to its earliest
iterations—or even to its fundamental interrelation with the executive branch of
government. 259 Although communicative expertise is impossible at the level of sign
associations, specialized tribunals hold a unique position in relation to governmental
policy. Oft-cited proximity to those affected is not a full answer to the justificatory
question of specialization, but it does point toward a more compelling basis for
interpretive authority. In his discussion of politicized pedagogy in administrative law
classrooms, Richard Thomas makes an important and transferable observation:
[T]here is no current consensus … on the organization and substance of
the new politically sensitive administrative law course that is to replace the
traditional “legalistic” course. Instead, we have a smorgasbord of “unitary
organizing principles,” each drawing heavily on different aspects of the
social sciences and/or political theory. … If the left wants a meaningful
battle in administrative law, it will find it not in the struggle to deconstruct
a pervasive false consciousness called “formalism” but rather in the
struggle to expand the acknowledged “politics” of administrative law to
include the political goals of the oppressed and dispossessed.260
Institutional difference embodies progressive potential to the extent it is explicitly named
and engaged with. It also depends on the discontinuation of text-based theories of
expertise. While interpretation is unavoidably political, masking this feature behind the
rhetoric of legislative guidance allows hierarchical bureaucracy to flourish.261 The final
step in conceptualizing policy expertise involves placing it in conversation with the
foregoing point—that no one, by virtue of their office, stands in a privileged place of
universality.
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Transparent policy work is essential because there is nothing outside the text,
nothing that does not require interpretation.262 Assessing legislative impacts, even at the
level of interaction with those accessing the service, is not divorced from unconscious
biases or normative value judgments.263 This is where the proliferation of lofty rhetoric
does significant damage by facilitating unstated interpretive work; there can be neither
expertise nor accountability when one simply reads a legislative scheme with unusual
repetition. In the literature, many scholars do politicize their structuring principles, but
fail to ask how and by whom they will be actualized. If respectful deference or dialogue
is crucially important to one’s image of legitimate judicial review, it is deeply significant
to ask who construes that dialogue and gives content to ‘respect.’ When we stop before
these questions, we advance meaningless signifiers in place of the “political goals”
evoked above. Interpretation necessitates a single textual association to be drawn from
virtually endless possibilities, but this can be done from a place of (more) defensible
institutional difference. If agencies articulate the lessons they take from their proximity to
those affected, they provide material for debate rather than preempting critical
engagement by relying on what a word ‘correctly’ or ‘reasonably’ means.
The structuring principles of administrative law obscure the violence of
interpretation in a manner that precludes direct engagement with the consequences of
legislation. It is undeniably comforting to imagine constraint in both democratically
enacted laws and our means of reading them, but this pretense comes at a considerable
cost. While the literature has long demonstrated a “functional … rather than formal” bent
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in administrative decision-making, the clear expression of political value judgments
remains elusive.264 We are presented instead with ethereal concepts, like amorphous
expertise in terms of legislative instruments, that do not require “candour” regarding
policy preferences.265 It is helpful, then, to look back to the legal realists, taking their core
insight that adjudication is always results-oriented as a starting point, and reorienting the
interpretive question toward perceived impacts. 266 However learned we imagine our
decision-makers, they remain embodied subjects without transcendent knowledge of
external realities. Giving imprecise content to the idea of expertise serves an ideological
function by changing the critical conversation. Instead of asking where power is vested
when meaning is in dispute—and, perhaps more importantly, why it has been so vested—
institutional difference is presented as a means of arriving at a predefined outcome that
will be assessed in relation to judicially defined (and, crucially, definable) limits. When
we talk about administrative law, we often fall silent at precisely the point of demanding
a justification for interpretive power that engages with the indeterminacy of meaning. The
relevant discourse reroutes interested readers into a matrix of structuring principles that
must therefore be assessed in terms of their hermeneutical utility.
(c.) Naming Constituent Elements
The law of interpretation appears determined to live up to its status as something
more than the imposition of a unitary perspective. Maxims and principles flourish
without requiring any consistency of application; after all, who can say whether
something like “common law constitutionalism” supports one definition over another?
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The legitimizing myths of statutory interpretation are insidious in two broad ways. First,
as discussed above, they distract from the salient question of who speaks when meaning
is in dispute. They answer with a disingenuous ‘no one,’ because meaning is always
already discoverable through the relevant legal steps, or perhaps more precisely with
‘everyone,’ since these principles ostensibly arise from democratic commitments within
law itself.267 Secondly, the nominal rules of interpretation are rhetorically difficult to
challenge. There is enough play in the relevant discursive field that the dominant
terminology persists without much opposition. If someone disagrees with the ideal
content of, say, the separation of powers, they advance their argument while retaining the
same signifier. These terms are placeholders for interpretive work that is either preempted
or deferred through the empire of language. Administrative law has a uniquely metadiscursive character, presuming to order the violence of interpretation through structuring
principles that are simply words about words. It is therefore important to level the
conceptual ground by inquiring into the connections between second-order language (i.e.,
interpretive principles that advance language to help us understand language) and the
work of legal hermeneutics.
There is no shortage of aspirational writing on the fundamental content of
administrative law. Although more structuring concepts have been advanced than could
be reproduced here, there are two broad areas that impact directly on the discourse of
interpretation: the language of values and the roles of governmental branches. The former
posits underlying limits in the exercise of interpretive authority while the latter suggests
that writing and reading legislation are exceptional tasks with clearly defined and
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delimited spheres of power. These popular ideals are presented as the raw materials from
which administrative power operates. In contrast, a critical reading presses the issue,
asking where these concepts fall silent and presume the stability of their signifying
potential.
1. The Language of Values
Legal interpretation begins with the unenviable task of reconciling our need for
justifications with the radical problems of linguistic communication. It is far from certain
that we would vest interpretive power in state actors if the process was transparently one
of imposing a single perspective. This problem is exacerbated in the administrative
context where the history, both domestically and abroad, “constitutes a series of ongoing
attempts

to legitimize unelected public administration in a constitutional liberal

democracy.” 268 The language of values is an understandable response, but one that
ultimately subsumes difference and masks the politics of interpretation. Indeed, the
authors of the foregoing quotation follow it up with “a commitment to reason.”269 This
phrase, while unremarkable, is characteristic of the critical response: There is a crisis of
legitimacy or a point of unchecked discretion and, so, it must be closed. Much like this
reliance on ‘reason,’ the ensuing discourse generally adopts a lofty ideal that is explicitly
normative. We have a long history of abusing ‘reason’ as an analytical tool. While the
relevant organizing principles come in a variety of forms, there is enough consistency to
discuss their internal logic and foreground their rhetorical function.
The most insidious form of this discourse positions guiding principles within the
law itself. It should be recalled that, in Law’s Abnegation, Vermeule hinges his argument
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on the idea of internal commitments—that the administrative state arises and expands as
the law “works itself pure.” 270 Similarly, though more explicitly, a Canadian critic
suggests that “legal principles such as fairness and equality reside within the common
law, are constitutive of legality, and inform (or should inform) statutory interpretation on
judicial review.”271 Again, this sentiment is not especially worthy of condemnation but is
adduced to demonstrate the character of the relevant discourse. The salient point is that
these claims implicitly answer my core question of who gets to speak when meaning is in
dispute: It is the law itself, “as a repository of principles that constitute the rule of law
and control the interpretation of statutes.”272 The result is clearly set-out in a recent
discussion about the conceptual status of legislation:
Dworkinian interpretivism, advocating interpretation of statutes in light of
moral principles, or modes of purposive interpretation that emphasise the
import of objective purpose and the consideration of values on statutory
interpretation, can be seen as correctness-oriented in this sense. They call
upon interpreters to put statutes to good use and read them as fulfilling
basic values and moral principles.”273
On the orthodox view, we do not learn who reads the relevant words with reference to
their necessarily embodied experiences of moral principles. The relationship between
principles and decisional agency is relegated to the margins because it is irrelevant on this
reading. Legal actors are presented as conduits for the ‘values’ that law infuses into
statutory instruments.
Beyond the work this rhetoric does to disguise the speaking subject—the
unilateral voice who must impose a subjective perspective on the definitional problem—
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the language of values renders dissent nonsensical. Consider, for instance, Paul Daly’s
assertion that “judicial review of administrative action is a values-based enterprise.”274
He continues on to the effect that “[i]ts practice—and probably also its development—
depends on the ongoing interaction between administrative law values—the rule of law,
good administration, democracy and separation of powers—in the common law
tradition.”275 Few are likely to argue that administrative law should avoid developing in a
way that is ‘good’ or ‘democratic.’ These terms do not simply preclude wholesale
opposition; rather, they issue from sites of pre-existing power and therefore embody
considerable rhetorical potential. The “values-based” approach to administrative
interpretation simultaneously masks authority and suggests that conceptual or formalistic
correctness exists within the enterprise. This is further exacerbated by the image of
clearly defined roles in relation to legal texts.
2. Reading Legislation
The modern principle appears in both tribunal and courtroom interpretations and
suggests a distinct relationship between Parliament and decision-makers. Much of the
discussion is, after all, dedicated to discerning their purposes and schematic choices. It is
easy to criticize the idea of legislative intent as a clear fiction, but doing so at length is
disingenuous. While much of the case law gestures toward some externalized locus of
will and purpose, there is an overwhelming sense that this is a self-conscious construct,
existing only for analytical and rhetorical ends.276 The idea, though, “still figures as a
trope in the general rhetoric of judges when they justify review, and is thought by some
public law theorists to be a necessary reference point for judicial review, as only it can
274
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support the claim that officials have acted … outside the scope of their delegated
authority.”277 There can be no disembodied intent, but its central place in the law of
interpretation raises larger questions about the status of institutions in relation to the
construction of meaning. If a legislative text can retain intentionality from its authors,
then the interpretive process is aimed at discoverable correctness. This is because
“sovereignty is both legally constituted and yet legally unlimited.”278 Democratic laws
reign, absent an alleged constitutional violation, and interpretation must be about
manifesting the embedded purpose of the relevant provision.
None of these ideals about statutory interpretation—and the lawmaking/governing
interrelation more generally—explain the presence of legal interpretation. Discourse
about interpretive work in the administrative state presupposes an institutional impact on
the ‘discovery’ of meaning. Otherwise, the idea of constraint is meaningless. If classical
authority “stands for the proposition that discretion is limited … by legal principles,”
there must be some play in the structure of interpretation.279 Broadly speaking, the
orthodox views suggests that legal reasoning or else administrative “field sensitivity” (to
use the language of Dunsmuir) will affect the analytical steps, but rules of general
application police the outer limits.280 This is, however, an inherently vexed point because
legal actors and many theorists are uncomfortable with the central place of subjective
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perspectives in legal interpretation. It is a relatively common refrain in administrative law
to hear that “[a]gencies are not entitled to base their statutory interpretations and
constructions on policy concerns and political considerations that are unrelated to their
statute’s semantic meaning and the legal norms that comprise their purposive
mandate.” 281 Essentially, there is something within the statutory language, but it
paradoxically comes out through recourse to privileged external heuristics.282
The metanarratives surrounding agency interpretation are roughly organized
around the idea of self-enclosed governance. Each institution has a specified place in the
construction and distillation of legal meaning. As a result, engagement with the violence
of interpretation is indefinitely deferred. Courts are not overturning specialized agencies
with better proximity to interested subjects; instead, when judges speak, it is an
expression of the democratic will. The constituent parts of administrative discourse
provide cover for the unilateral imposition of linguistic meaning. This, of course, requires
a presumption in the stability of structuring concepts.. When we talk about administrative
law, there is a conceptual bedrock that arises before the politics of constructed legal
meaning. Put another way, the proliferation of institutional ideals and amorphous limits
creates a discursive field that stands in place of wholesale critique regarding the
(necessary) ascendancy of a single interpretive perspective.283 The literature that forges
our theories of bureaucratic regulation provides the backdrop for the judicial exercise of
power and disappearance of controversy in the administrative state.

281

Evan Criddle, “The Constitution of Agency Statutory Interpretation” (2016) 69 Vand L Rev 325 at 348.
For a particularly clear statement to this effect, see: Jonathan Adler, “King v. Burwell: Desperately
Seeking Ambiguity in Clear Statutory Text” (2015) 40:3 Health Politics, Pol’y & L 577.
283
See chapter 4, below.
282

92

IV. The Metaphysics of Administrative Law
The case of Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick provides a useful demarcation point in
the study of administrative interpretation for two main reasons.284 First, this is a selfconscious moment of rupture and invention. The majority confronts the “troubling
question” of appropriate institutional roles and demands “real guidance” for all
involved. 285 In an almost divine register, the co-authors pronounce an end to our
collective waiting: “The time has arrived for a reassessment of the question.”286 As a
result, the “underlying tension” of administrative law finds a new (rhetorical) resolution
through legal reformulation and criticism of prior approaches.287 It is, in short, almost
impossible to talk about the current law in this area without some mention of the shift
embodied in Dunsmuir.288 Secondly, and more uniquely, this decision introduces a new
means of obscuring the nature and function of interpretation.289 While the majority deals
in age-old tropes—citing the ‘rule of law,’ for instance, 15 times in their analysis—the
judgment suggests a benevolent epoch of respectful deference and practical guidance.290
Dunsmuir looks actively beyond itself, creating a fresh approach to judicial review that
will signify guidance for the lower courts. In result, the play(s) of power in the
administrative state are buried under fresh layers of institutional posturing and faith in the
universality of legal definitions.
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Dunsmuir is a frame that organizes interpretive discourse from the bench. It
provides a shared set of signifiers and presumes their stability. By virtue of the majority
opinion, courts now discuss ideas of deference and the relative reasonableness of a
definition without much meta-engagement or analytical discomfort. Moreover, as authors
that actively sought to recast the field of judicial review, Bastarache and LeBel JJ realized
their goals—empirical research shows an almost automatic acceptance of Dunsmuir in all
the subsequent jurisprudence.291 This decision will not, however, live forever. A shift in
the law is imminent, but this is all the more reason to take stock of administrative
interpretation in its current form.292 With all its language of dialogue, deference, and the
reluctant threat of reversal, Dunsmuir stands as a classical distillation of the irresolvable
tensions within administrative law. This case, in other words, is symptomatic of a larger
problem—that language does not conduce to a verifiable “range of possible, acceptable
outcomes”—but endeavours to hide it in a distinct way.
This is an interesting time for legal interpretation in the administrative state. As
another restatement looms—or, perhaps, dissipates in a jurisprudential recommitment to
Dunsmuir—it is important to understand how the politics of linguistic meaning work in
the background of our case law. In the absence of a metalanguage, it is judges who speak
when meaning is in dispute. This is the inevitable result of unverifiable signs and a
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system of written laws: someone must have the final definitional word. Unfortunately,
this is not an especially attractive means of presenting bureaucratic regulation. As such,
considerable work is done on the bench to hide the nature of interpretation from
interested parties. The case law since Dunsmuir does this in distinct ways, but the work
itself is highly transferable—particularly since the rhetoric of legal interpretation suffers
from relatively consistent points of weakness. In an effort to prove my answer to the
ideological question of who speaks to contested meaning, this chapter identifies three
main ways that the post-Dunsmuir Supreme Court case law masks the violence of
interpretation.293 First, meaning is presented externally, suggesting that judges merely
find the relevant textual association. This necessarily obscures the violence of
interpretation, wordlessly replacing the ascendancy of a single perspective with the
performance of impartial ‘legal reasoning.’ Secondly, the speaking subject is disguised
behind a barrage of voices. The administrative state features a panoply of legal actors and
source material, and this allows judges to locate their preferences in the words of others.
Finally, the relevant jurisprudence manipulates the idea of reasonableness to enforce
unilateral power that presents as diverse and deferential.
(a.) Finding Objective Meaning
If language defies universal meaning, then there is something decidedly unsettling
about the practice of statutory interpretation. There can never be a uniquely ‘correct’
definition, but legal decision-makers impose their perspective everyday, providing a
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textual association with the threat of state force.294 Administrative law is both uniquely
well-positioned to handle the contingency of linguistic work and profoundly uneasy
about the play in this structure.295 On the former, judicial review embodies a distinct
commitment to recognizing a “range” of answers to interpretive questions, at least so
long as the speaker can justify herself. The latter point, however, is equally characteristic:
Bureaucratic governance exists in a long history of anxiety about illegitimate decisionmaking and inappropriate review. Engaging with inherently meaningless signs and
signifiers pushes this discomfort to its limits; as the need for non-judicial discretion
grows with the complexities of the administrative state, so too does the spectre of
tyrannical freedom and gaps in decisional restraint.296 We expect state power to rely on
something more than the unilateral preferences of a privileged decision-maker, but when
unverifiable textual associations must be forged, external reference points are limited. We
are, as Margaret Atwood observes of Canadian literature, in search of a communal story
or unifying myth.297
The jurisprudence since Dunsmuir has answered this challenge, though not in so
many words. It is taken as axiomatic that something out there constrains interpretive
work and its review. The language of “values” and “principles” is ubiquitous in Supreme
Court jurisprudence, but a more fundamental presumption about the stability of language
underwrites these grand claims. Much like Stanley Fish’s argument that “[i]nterpretation
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is not a theoretical issue, but an empirical one,” the prevailing discourse from the bench
suggests the discoverability of objective meaning.298 When the first move is, as it was for
Cromwell J in Figliola, recourse to “the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words,”
there is clearly an underlying faith in the statutory instrument’s ability to retain
content.299 Crucially, if the text signifies something definite—that is, if legislation is
imbued with meaning that can be distilled through the laws of interpretation—then there
is no danger of self-serving or capricious discretion. This comforting idea is unfortunately
incompatible with contemporary theories of language; there is, to paraphrase Derrida,
nothing inside the statute apart from what the reader places there.300 By denying the
problem, however, legal actors can present their preferred definitions as dispassionate
truth. While claims to meaning are necessarily political and contingent, the relevant
jurisprudence obscures value judgments behind the Dworkinian “language of
objectivity.”
This is not to suggest that adjudicators are especially vocal about their unique
ability to impose a definitional perspective as law. Indeed, part of the rhetorical force of
external meaning depends on recognition rather than construction. Supreme Court
jurisprudence in particular gestures beyond itself to find things like values and principles
that cast light on the best reading of a statute.301 The impact is essentially twofold:
Gesturing toward an external locus of meaning obscures the nature of interpretation as the
unilateral ascendancy of one textual association and it nominally complies with the
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administrative law commitment to the “range” of legitimate answers.302 If meaning can
be assessed in relation to something stable, then judicial review on such questions is
unremarkable; the bench can find the meaning of the provision and hold it up to the
proffered administrative definition. In practice, this is complicated by the recognition
that, as the 1979 CUPE decision puts it, an interpretation can “lie logically at the heart of
the specialized jurisdiction confided to the Board.”303 In other words, the aforementioned
expertise assigned to agencies—that which is ill-defined and easily manipulable—
necessitates some recognition of analytical difference.304 Judges leverage this form of
deferential rhetoric to suggest that, while they found external meaning, it can differ for
those outside their ranks. This sounds progressive, but it quickly reduces down to an
elitist insistence on legal reasoning.
Recourse to law as a privileged repository of inferential wisdom is a judicial
trope, but one that is rarely considered in discussions of administrative interpretation.305
At base, legal reasoning is a hierarchical, imperialistic force that signifies very little,
substantively speaking.306 In an early effort to distil its precepts, an American scholar
mused that “[t]he effort to find complete agreement before the institution goes to work is
302
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meaningless. It is to forget the very purpose for which the institution of legal reasoning
has been fashioned. This should be remembered as a world community suffers in the
absence of law.” 307 Our disagreements about words (among other things) are
benevolently resolved by elite legal actors—but they do not decide, per se. Rather, the
rhetorical strength of legal reasoning (an umbrella term that includes invocations of
normative content, along with varied ‘rules’ of interpretation) lies in its suggestive
impartiality. 308 When judges find meaning in legislative instruments or amorphous
structuring principles, they deny decisional agency. They speak beyond themselves.
Indeed, in a relatively recent decision, the Court unanimously held that an interpretation
can simply reflect the words at issue—that they stand in a position to discern whether an
administrative interpretation meets the ‘true’ definition embodied in the legislation.309
This has profound implications for understanding the process and review of agency
interpretation.
An administrator interprets her home (or a related) statute and is owed
presumptive deference.310 Where this is not rebutted, the ubiquitous “range” comes into
play; as Moldaver J puts it, “because legislatures do not always speak clearly and because
the tools of statutory interpretation do not always guarantee a single clear answer,
legislative

provisions

will

on

occasion

be

susceptible

to

multiple reasonable interpretations.”311 When there are multiple justifiable answers, “the
resolution of unclear language in an administrative decision maker’s home statute is
307
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usually best left to the decision maker.”312 These relatively uncontroversial doctrinal
points rely on the idea of externalized meaning. There are “tools” of interpretation that
produce results, which are only “on occasion” subject to linguistic subjectivity. Once
legal heuristics distil meaning, a judge can determine whether legitimate processes could
produce alternatives; the “range” is rarely discussed in detail, but it must contain at least
implicit content if judges can assess whether an administrative definitions fits within its
bounds.313 Again, the idea is one of dispassionate observation, as though the act of
creating additional ‘reasonable’ textual associations is more impersonal than the firstorder interpretation. The jurisprudence relies on the performance of dispassionate
analysis to obscure the singularity of interpretation.
For the Supreme Court, meaning is deferred—that is, presented externally—in
two distinct, though interrelated, ways. First, the nature of interpretation is presented as
the actualization of internal legal commitments. There is a pervasive sense that
structuring principles constrain the process of construing legislation in a manner that is
democratically impersonal.314 The second stage is a move to the particular. Given the lack
of content embodied in the ostensible values of interpretation, the law of interpretation
must quickly shroud itself in statutory surroundings. At the moment where one expects to
learn how, say, the ‘rule of law’ assists in definitional work, these lofty ideals reduce
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down to a purpose that is found and never justified.315 Interpretation is rhetorically
framed around “fundamental values and … fundamental goals” without explaining how
any value, however “fundamental,” can inform an unverifiable textual association that
has already provoked protracted disagreement.316 The results justify a preferred definition
in grandiose language without any indication of how amorphous structuring principles
can give content to language.
1. Overarching Values: Reading Together
In the oft-cited case of Doré v. Barreau du Québec, the Court glossed much of the
formative jurisprudence to distil a new rule about constitutional rights in the
administrative state.317 Where a Charter breach is alleged, agencies are owed deference
that transcends the usual Oakes test.318 Abella J, writing for a unanimous bench, cites
“expertise and specialization” to suggest a “particular familiarity with the competing
considerations at play in weighing Charter values.”319 At issue was the interpretation of
the relevant professional Code of Ethics, which imposes a “series of broad standards …
open to a wide range of interpretations.”320 The result reflects this, as the Disciplinary
Council decision was upheld through three levels of review. At this level of headnote-
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esque summation, one finds a deferential slant in both the overarching treatment of
administrative Charter breaches and the extended range of definitions available in this
case. Here, a tribunal is allowed to speak to linguistic meaning and, more broadly, agency
decision-makers will be allowed to assess the impacts of their interpretations, again, “by
virtue of expertise and specialization.”321 At this first level, guidance is found outside the
statutory instrument, but mediated by the laws of interpretation.
Early in the judgment, Abella J submits that “[i]t goes without saying that
administrative decision-makers must act consistently with the values underlying the grant
of discretion, including Charter values.”322 Her decision to express what she considers
obvious is important because it sets up a series of presumptions. It is taken as axiomatic
that the language of values should constrain the exercise of discretion; the question, then,
becomes one of operationalizing this content in terms of a framework for review. Even as
detail is added via recourse to Baker, the Court faces the unenviable task of rendering
“fundamental Canadian values” and then holding administrative discretion to those
terms.323 For at least some readers, the language of distinctly national values evokes
prejudice—one is reminded of the recent calls for “anti-Canadian values” screening—but
these words have a distinct function in our jurisprudence.324 This is not to suggest that the
term is unproblematic, particularly given the lack of explanation regarding the unique
validity of our national values, but the most important issue for this discussion concerns
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the sources from which judges derive governing principles. They arise, we are told,
largely from the values in the Charter, which are, according to that text’s preamble, both
“the supremacy of God and the rule of law.”325 In practice, they tend to mirror protected
rights like equality and the grandiose “principles of fundamental justice.”326 Even on this
sympathetic (or, at least, searching) reading, it is unclear how any of the foregoing values
resolves the definitional problem at issue.
I am far from alone in making this claim. The Doré framework has been derided
as indeterminate and unduly complex for ground-level application.327 While these are
important concerns, they leave the more persistent issue unremarked. Ethereal concepts
of this kind mask the play(s) of power in the administrative state through a persistent
belief in the stability of language. Applying something like ‘fundamental justice’ to a
hermeneutical question is complex because it is meaningless, at least outside the
interpreting individual.328 This case serves as a sustained example, but the problem is a
longstanding one that goes beyond Doré and its subsequent impact at the lower levels.
Recently, in Quebec (Commission des normes, de l'équité, de la santé et de la sécurité du
travail) v. Caron, the Court held that all Quebec legislation must be interpreted “in
accordance with the Quebec Charter.”329 As mentioned in the foregoing chapter, it can be
challenging to criticize the operation of principles; here, it was the “duty to
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accommodate.”330 Few would argue that workplace legislation cannot benefit from a duty
to accommodate lens, but the permissive mandate is much broader. Recourse to Charter
principles is based on the deemed purpose of the relevant enactment.331 While a duty to
accommodate stipulation is perhaps less vulnerable to abuse, as it would take significant
rhetorical work for it to justify, say, an anti-labour stance, the process of constructing the
intent of a provision defies the possibility of constraint. It is also worth noting that,
should one dislike the rhetorical impact of a given principle, there is no reason to invoke
it.332
When the administrative decision in Doré was upheld, the Court presented as
self-effacing. Principles, like those in Caron, are meant to defer the site of authority, to
move the act of judgment beyond the courtroom and into the sphere of impartiality. In
much the same way, a finding of specialization suggests judicial forbearance.333 When,
for instance, the executive wishes to be represented by a non-lawyer, and the
“interpretation … respecting administrative justice falls squarely within the ATQ's
expertise,” then the Supreme Court appears to be doing nothing at all when they uphold
the decision.334 Yet one reads this case, and those like it, with a sense of latent agency.
Prior to this particular grant of deference on the basis of expertise, the Court discussed
the indicia of reasonableness, finding, inter alia, that there was no issue of central
importance here, and that this narrow question did fall within the specialization of the
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relevant decision-maker. 335 These claims rarely find sustained justification in the
jurisprudence, but the indeterminacy thesis, along with the practice of reading the flexible
results in administrative case law, suggests that an argument can always be made that,
say, this was a centrally important issue. The treatment of structuring principles at the
Supreme Court relies on the stability of language if interpretation is to be anything more
than the unilateral imposition of a single perspective. It is a challenge the Court has
addressed by grounding their concepts in the faux-neutrality of interpretive rules.
2. Localized Values: Reading with Purpose
One major point of troubling vacuity in the modern principle is the optional and
ill-defined use of the “entire context.” Interpretations are often advanced without learning
much from the circumstances of enactment or the debates surrounding a provision, yet
these are often adduced when they seem to favour a particular result. Much of the work in
this area focuses, at least nominally, on what the provision hopes to achieve.336 Ruth
Sullivan puts it simply: “In statutory interpretation there are two categories of
presumptions—presumptions about how legislative texts are drafted and presumptions
about what policies and values the legislature wishes to promote when it enacts
legislation.” 337 These presumptions are no more theoretically compelling than those
directed at the first-order question of interpretation. Even where a purpose is expressed
through a preambular ‘whereas,’ it continues to rely on the reader to impose meaning.
Purposive interpretation is one more point of misdirection that locates authority outside
the courtroom. In judicial review since Dunsmuir, recourse to intent particularizes the
335
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lofty ideals of interpretation.338 When purpose is claimed, Parliament is speaking. This
has particular resonance in administrative law, where judges navigate the bounded
expertise that hews to tribunal interpretations.339
This is a relatively nuanced point, but its operation is easily discernible in the
Alberta (Information and Privacy Commissioner) v. University of Calgary decision.340
Here, the Court considered the purpose of the solicitor-client privilege exceptions, as set
out in the relevant Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.341 On the
(found) facts, the legislature spoke through their silences: The relevant provision required
something more for the renunciation of privilege.342 Côté J, writing for the majority,
glossed the modern principle to add that “it recognizes legislative respect for fundamental
values.”343 Again, we find ill-defined externality—but, this time, it is put in play through
a contextual application of the modern principle. It is both telling and alarming that, in
the concurring judgments, there are significant disagreements about what the law of
interpretation actually does. For the majority, “[t]he modern approach to statutory
interpretation requires legislative texts to be read in their entire context. And resort to
other texts from different jurisdictions may be helpful in determining what that entire
context is.”344 Cromwell J, concurring in result, finds an “anchor” in the text, and that is
emphatically all the context he needs.345
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Context and purpose exist in close interrelation since the overwhelming majority
of relevant decisions use the former as a means of discovering the latter. When courts
make their turn to the modern principle, they are ‘finding’ meaning in a way that
collapses the general into the particular. 346 This is an active “moment of rupture,”
characterized by ephemerality, where judges transform the jurisprudential space. They
briefly disrupt the language of values to render a contextualized result.347 It is therefore a
moment of particular importance for understanding how power is vested and disguised in
legal interpretation. Consider, for instance, the unstated presumptions that inform the idea
that “the intended scope of judicial review legislation is to be interpreted in accordance
with the usual rule that the terms of a statute are to be read purposefully in light of its
text, context and objectives.”348 We find the norm clearly marked: There is a usual rule
that sets out the routine concerns of statutory interpretation. The relevant term is read for
purpose in light of words, words about those words, and purpose. Reliance is placed on
the stability of language in a manner that strains even orthodox theories of legal
interpretation. The jurisprudence must distract from its own inconsistency—that it
presumes to resolve disagreements about language with recourse to more of the same. In
some ways, this is an unfair criticism given that nothing is outside of the text; however, if
people can diverge on what a statute means, it is difficult to imagine how the status of
context and purpose signify beyond this form of subjectivity. This challenge is masked
behind amorphous moves to the legislative surroundings.
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Contextualizing interpretation adds the illusion of content where legal maxims run
out. The decision in Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Khosa is instructive here,
as the Court frames its methodology around classical authority: “As Rand J. commented
in Roncarelli v. Duplessis, … ‘there is always a perspective within which a statute is
intended to operate.’” 349 At the moment where guiding principles appear ready for
explication, they disappear. In their place, we find ground-level application that operates
in isolation through a single perspective, discerned through the law of interpretation.
When judges speak about, say, the distinct purpose of regulatory legislation, which
“differs from criminal legislation in the way it balances individual liberties against the
protection of the public,” they locate definitions in that which is concurrently
transcendent and mundane.350 The focus remains on the legislative text, along with its
“entire context,” but the bench is implying the communal availability of this content—
they gesture well beyond themselves to find uncontroversial meaning in the routine work
of legal interpretation.
It is important to note that this can involve recourse to principles, but opens up the
possibilities far wider than the threshold discussion of guiding principles. Immediately
after Cromwell J cites the modern principle in British Columbia (Workers' Compensation
Board) v. Figliola, he frames the interpretive question around “the principles of the
finality doctrines rather than … their technical tenets.” 351 In a case that explicitly
addresses which institutional actor can validly speak to meaning, this contextual use of
principles allows for continued rhetorical misdirection. On this official reading, it is not
the court of last word that decides the question of interpretive authority; rather, the
349
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“general principles of administrative law” conduce to situational maxims that disappear
alternative voices. 352 The modern principle embodies a commitment to purposive
interpretation for good reason—it is both malleable and always already justified. As the
majority in Canadian Broadcasting Corp v. SODRAC 2003 Inc puts it, “purposive
construction is a tool of statutory interpretation to assist in understanding the meaning of
the text. It is not a stand-alone basis for the Court to develop its own theory of what it
considers appropriate policy.”353 When meaning is in dispute, the Court uses the idea of
purpose to evoke impersonal values, thereby disguising and deferring the speech-act.354
Judges use this communicative faith to mask the violence of their work. There can
be no unilateral power if the Court simply finds meaning, but the impossibility of such a
task is disguised behind principles just far enough out of focus to retain their credibility.
By insisting that meaning exists externally, judges occupy a privileged space of
recognition and discovery.355 Although parties are in clear and expensive disagreement
about textual signification, interpretive difference is rendered nonsensical through truth
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claims about external legislative meaning.356 This holds a particular resonance upon
judicial review because the sites of potential meaning are even more diverse. Courts can
locate textual associations in things like presumed expertise or purposive maxims, but
interpretation always remains a matter of discovery rather than construction.357 This goes
a significant distance in perpetuating the legalistic, uncontroversial character of statutory
interpretation, but it leaves judicial speech too far in the open. The next step, then, is one
of divesting legal actors of any active recognition at all. Misdirection about who speaks
when meaning is in dispute immunizes the judiciary from charges of illegitimate agency
or error. In the decade since Dunsmuir, the Supreme Court has masked the unilateral
force of imposing definitional sense behind the rhetoric of principles and purpose. The
vacuity of this approach is, however, further disguised by an insistence that someone else
is speaking.
(b.) Throwing Voices
The administrative state depends on a panoply of voices, speaking in concert,
about what legislation means. It is an unwieldy system that begins in medias res.
Deliberation has occurred and ink has been spilt long before a definitional disagreement
is brought forth for adjudication. At the risk of providing a high school civics refresher,
interpretation happens only after democracy is reduced to representatives and their
decisions are sent to be drafted, subject to further refinement.358 The ensuing words are
disparate in their aims, but increasingly interested in what a literary critic might call
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“reader-response.”359 Amidst the diversification of decision-making that characterizes
administrative law, there is a unified, top-down concern with how and by whom our laws
will be read.360 To this end, innumerable areas of regulation have been carved out for
tribunals to read, at least initially, in the place of judges. The nuances continue unabated
and while some are obvious (like the distinct standards of judicial review), the
aforementioned language of principles creates a cacophony of governmental expression.
When the Supreme Court finally decides what a provision means, they can assign that
authoritative definition to any number of interested actors. The unitary interpretive work
is disappeared behind the appearance of institutional collegiality.
A recent criminal law decision from our highest court provides an unexpected
gloss on the problem. In R. v. Clarke, it was held that administrative law has a unique
relationship with “ambiguity.”361 This is because a lack of statutory clarity does not
necessarily act as a “divining rod” for Charter values; instead, “[t]he issue in the
administrative context … is whether the exercise of discretion by the administrative
decision-maker unreasonably limits the Charter protections in light of the legislative
objective of the statutory scheme.”362 There is much to untangle here. Beneath layers of
constitutional protections and deemed Parliamentary goals lies a core of discretionary
activity that must remain ‘reasonable.’ In other words, judicial review can locate meaning
in legislative expression, administrative discretion, or legal principles that transcend
individual actors. It is further assumed that, as the Court put it in Doré, “[b]y recognizing
359
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that administrative decision-makers are both bound by fundamental values and
empowered to adjudicate them, Baker ceded interpretive authority on those issues to
those decision-makers.”363 This creates a system in which the Charter is said to “nurture”
administrative law, thus ‘infusing’ values in the act of interpretation. 364 We are
confronted with expressive content prior to the act of interpretation. Dialogue between
institutions, for all its promise, can also jeopardize the ability to locate points of
decisional agency.365
This misdirection often traces the classical dichotomies of administrative law. A
distinction has been drawn, for instance, between policy and law, which necessarily
implicates Parliament, the administrative decision-maker, and the judiciary. 366 The
tenuous dualism at play here is particularly problematic for those seeking interpretive
candour; given the aforementioned malleability of principles and purpose, policy
preferences can always be shrouded in the “entire context” of the statute. Similarly, the
presentation of the discretion/deference opposition creates a surplus of (ostensibly)
relevant signification. As Binnie J in Khosa puts it, “[w]hether or not the court should
exercise its discretion in favour of the application will depend on the court's appreciation
of the respective roles of the courts and the administration as well as the ‘circumstances
of each case.’”367 In this way, content is said to arise from the factual matrix, the
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provision, and institutional difference—but, since these are assessed (or ‘appreciated’) by
the Court, they can be relevant or not depending on the preferred outcome.
The distinct position of administrative decision-makers relative to their delegated
subject matter serves as an important point of rhetorical misdirection in the relevant
jurisprudence. Given the malleability of specialization, courts can buttress a definition
they find compelling while denying the operation of expertise wherever convenient.
Since the opening line of Alberta Teachers’ Association, and again in that of Capilano, it
has been legally assumed that “specialized expertise with the assigned subject matter” is a
core feature of administrative law, but its operation is—and must be—unconstrained.368
While the ill-defined contours of privileged knowledge are discussed above, there is a
distinct function of expertise in the relevant jurisprudence: It evokes a concordance
between legislative meaning and the speaking subject. In Canadian National Railway Co.
v. Canada (Attorney General), for instance, the Court found that “[e]conomic regulation
is an area with which the Governor in Council has particular familiarity.”369 As a result,
the presumption of deference, cited to Dunsmuir, was upheld.370 If there is a core of
information surrounding “economic regulation” (which is unlikely), it is not something
courts have been reticent to pronounce upon.371 By ascribing knowledge to this decisionmaker, however, the Court buries the authorial voice beneath additional layers of
democratic meaning. Here, Parliament enacts a statute and infuses it with their
distributive goals. At the same time, they vest interpretive authority in a non-judicial
368
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decision-maker who uses a combination of their knowledge and legislative guidance to
forge definitional sense. When this is reviewed, the Court is speaking, to be sure, but only
to narrate the dispositive reasoning somewhere beyond the bench.
In the foregoing example, and those like it, courts are not compelled to find
expertise at the level of definitional meaning. The doctrine is sufficiently malleable to
support a holding against the very possibility of non-judicial specialization on “economic
regulation.” Implicit in all of these decisions is a theory of institutional competence.
Where convenient, courts can vest tribunals with expertise that they will recognize and
correspondingly divest themselves of any positive action. The operation of ‘legal
reasoning,’ however, is closely guarded by the judiciary and helpful for effecting
“disguised correctness review.”372 Consider, for instance, the classical—but persistent—
dichotomy cited in Khosa: “the issues to be resolved had to do with immigration policy,
not law.”373 Carving out this space for administrative decision-makers has the unstated
impact of securing a distinctly legal space for the bench. Tribunals are assigned a “core of
… mandate and expertise” and the courts enjoy authority over legalistic interpretation,
which can include “principles” along with “legislative context and purpose.”374 The
ensuing compartmentalization is both vacuous and rhetorically effective where courts
wish to speak in concert with other voices.
This is pushed to its inevitable limits of misdirection in the recent decision of
Green v. Law Society of Manitoba.375 It begins with the language of extreme deference.
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The impugned rule from the Law Society must not only be unreasonable, it must be one
that “no reasonable body informed by [the relevant] factors could have [enacted].”376
Despite this gesture toward abdication, the ensuing analysis finds the Court performing a
“two-step” review.377 First, there is a threshold move to the modern principle, which sets
the provision in legal terms; secondly, we learn whether or not this reading could have
been enacted by a “reasonable body.”378 In result, the Court valorizes their access to
‘legal reasoning,’ which serves as a reference point against which to construe an
administrative definition. There is no critical engagement with the “expansive purpose”
they use as an interpretive tool, nor with the idea that the text itself is never exhaustive.379
Instead, we find the decision attributed to the Law Society while the background
construction of reasonableness takes place within the courtroom. There can be no
meaningful distinction between the law of interpretation and the policy concerns that
animate it.380 Driedger’s mandate is not sealed with doctrinal purity. By presenting these
institutional delineations, however, courts are able to assign active decision-making to
non-judicial actors while maintaining overarching control over the contours of these
categories. Judges are always speaking to legal meaning, but have ample opportunity to
deny that speech.
When interpretation is understood as the unilateral imposition of a textual
association, the obvious question concerns the person(s) empowered to forge that
376
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meaning. We rarely receive an express answer, particularly in the administrative state
where interpretive work is presented through a cacophony of speaking subjects. A legal
core is reserved for judges—perhaps most clearly in Dunsmuir itself with the four
rebuttals to reasonableness—but it is often deferred where legislative meaning is
refracted through an administrative decision-maker.381 The violence of giving legal force
to a subjective definition is effectively disguised when three levels of government speak
in harmony. On my reading, Parliament provides source material from which to impose
interpretive sense; an agency does exactly that; and, on review, a court does the same
before deciding whether or not to uphold the original embodied definition. Even where
deference reads as pseudo-abdication, there is work being done within this privileged
legal sphere that produces a definitional result and, where necessary, a “range of
acceptable outcomes.” Interpretation is always subject to judicial approval, but disguising
this fact behind both the idea of external meaning and the presentation of varied
institutional roles further legitimizes the preferred result. The relevant doctrine is
malleable enough to enforce a single answer while masking the play(s) of power in the
administrative state through the language of reasonableness.
(c.) The Only Reasonable Answer
For all their rhetoric about meaning embedded within statutory instruments, the
Supreme Court was forced to admit to an open-endedness in McLean v. British Columbia
(Securities Commission).382 The decision turned in large part on the definition of “the
events” in relation to a limitation period. While Moldaver J, writing for the majority, held
that such a vague provision essentially delegated authority on a case-by-case basis to the
381
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relevant Commission, he provides an additional gloss on the interrelation between
reasonableness and interpretation.383 His comments, which were unnecessary for the
disposition of this case, are worth reproducing in full:
It will not always be the case that a particular provision permits multiple
reasonable interpretations.
Where the ordinary tools of statutory
interpretation lead to a single reasonable interpretation and the
administrative decision maker adopts a different interpretation, its
interpretation will necessarily be unreasonable—no degree of deference
can justify its acceptance … In those cases, the “range of reasonable
outcomes” … will necessarily be limited to a single reasonable
interpretation—and the administrative decision maker must adopt it.384
The impact of this holding is twofold. First, and obviously, it facilitates a version of
judicial supremacy that operates through the language of deference. A clearer use of
binary correctness is difficult to imagine—if the decision-maker fails to adopt the single
definition preferred by the reviewing court, she is acting unreasonably. This decision
stands for the proposition that, where a judicially generated “range” is limited to one
answer, it will be overturned despite a governing standard of reasonableness. Secondly,
and relatedly, McLean evokes the aforementioned sphere of legality through recourse to
“ordinary tools of statutory interpretation.” This allows for significant manipulation in a
regime that “takes its colour from the context.”385
The rhetorical value of reasonableness is perhaps most clearly demonstrated
through the concurring judgments in Wilson v. Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd.386 In a
relatively famous proposal to adopt reasonableness as the single standard of judicial
review, Abella J reads Dunsmuir as an affirmation of her task. It does not, she suggests,
383
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mandate a fixed number of standards but rather ensures that there will always be some
measure of judicial oversight available in administrative law.387 Her critique of the fauxsimplicity brought about post-Dunsmuir is alive to difficulties that characterize this area
of the law until, very suddenly, it is not. She hints at the amorphous character of our
“potentially indeterminate number of varying degrees of deference” and finds that
deference must imply “no uniquely correct answer to the question.”388 She points to the
obvious flaw in cases like McLean—that unitary reasonableness is just correctness—
before suggesting that both approaches “can live comfortably under a more broadly
conceived understanding of reasonableness.”389 In other words, Abella J identifies the
profound fluctuations in judges’ applications of deference and then suggests that the
problem can be solved by calling everything by the same name.
There are two perfunctory concurring reasons alongside hers that, taken together,
constitute a majority and ensure the persistence of correctness review. It took Cromwell J
only three paragraphs to conclude that “developing new and apparently unlimited
numbers of gradations of reasonableness review … is not an appropriate development of
the standard of review jurisprudence.”390 His concerns are warranted and unavoidable. In
a recent comment on how a single reasonableness standard might be operationalized, one
critic suggests that,
by demonstrating that the range of reasonable outcomes is constrained by
statutory language, pre-existing jurisprudence and so on, the Court can
provide a significant degree of structure to areas of substantive law.
Without necessarily substituting judgment as it would by applying
387
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correctness (or “disguised correctness”) review, it can indicate that
administrative decision-makers have, relatively speaking, a narrower
margin of interpretation in some areas than in others. … the analytical
structure of reasonableness review provides some safeguards against
judicial intrusion on administrative decision-makers’ autonomy.”391
This idea of constraint via (inter alia) statutory language is, as mentioned above, deeply
tempting but ultimately impossible. The foregoing passage is instructive because it traces
the contours of aspirational reasonableness before demonstrating its rhetorical strength. It
has become shorthand for judicial inactivity and progressive deference, which helps
explain the majority’s terse conservatism in Wilson. While the vast majority of decisions
fall into reasonableness review, the threat of correctness flatters the former dialogic
standard—even where it avails of only a single ‘reasonable’ answer.
Interpretive reasonableness exemplifies the malleability of this almost circular
standard, where, “to be unreasonable, … the decision must be said to fall outside ‘a range
of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and law.’”392
In other words, judges are constrained by a conceptual range governed by the ideas of
possibility, acceptability, and defensibility—or, given the emptiness of these signifiers,
by nothing at all. Although it is well-settled that statutory interpretation defaults to a
reasonableness review, there is little consistency in the contours of the analysis.393 In one
decision, it was found that “Driedger's modern rule of statutory interpretation provides
helpful guidance” when assessing the reasonableness of a given interpretation.394 Another
case finds interpretive reasonableness in a definition that “accords ... with the plain words
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of the provision, its legislative history, its evident purpose, and its statutory context.”395
None of these rhetorical gestures to ‘ordinary grammar’ or amorphous context provide
meaningful space for engagement. They are conclusory statements that mask the value
judgments that inform the un/reasonableness assessment. Statutory interpretation requires
the ascension of a single perspective; the current approach allows it to be that of the
judiciary, disguised behind the language of respectful deference.
When meaning is in dispute, the last authoritative speaker imposes a textual
association that becomes legally binding. Judicial review unambiguously vests that power
in the courts, but there are significant ideological advantages to be gained from denying
the violence of interpretation. Masking the play(s) of power in the administrative state
recasts contingent, political sign associations as natural, inevitable, and externally
available. It is normative adjudication at the level of linguistic sense, and it never reveals
the profound play within its ill-defined structures. Infinitely malleable—and occasionally
binary—reasonableness is one method of ‘finding’ statutory meaning, but it works in
concert with the aforementioned moves to externality and institutional misdirection. The
result is a body of case law that asserts a unilateral image of how language means while
refusing to present that work for critical engagement. This is particularly insidious in
light of both contemporary linguistics and our textual legal system. No one holds divine
or even ‘correct’ knowledge about signification, but someone must be vested with the
final word for legal resolution. The violence of interpretation is a necessary feature of
language and our embodied experiences of reading it—an insight that both complicates
and refocuses the possibility of progress.
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V. On the Continued Necessity of Statutory Interpretation
There is no law outside the practice of interpretation. One cannot write without an
experience of that text, and cannot respond to a rule, permissive grant, or anything else
without first perceiving and thereby interpreting it. Since we are embodied individuals
without access to a metalanguage, these premises underwrite a sustained critique of
statutory interpretation. If language reflects nothing but itself, a definition with legal
force necessarily privileges those in power.396 Any claim to interpretive ‘reasonableness’
runs afoul of the basic tenet of the linguistic turn, that “[b]etween consciousness,
perception (internal or external) and the ‘world,’ rupture is perhaps not possible, even in
the subtle form of the reduction.”397 The current law of interpretation is, then, profoundly
capricious. It is legalistic sound and fury that distracts from the violence of its task.
Perhaps surprisingly, these insights leave the core of statutory interpretation untouched.
‘Nothing beyond texts’ as a theoretical mantra leaves no possibility of communal
interpretation. Even where we discuss and agree upon a textual association, that discourse
is itself a text that we interpret without verifiable congress.398 In law, as in decisionmaking more generally, someone must have the last definitional word. This is not a
matter of principled governance but rather a necessary feature of language’s empire in the
administrative state.
Legal texts proliferate and mean nothing outside the act of reading them. This is
often unproblematic. People do, for instance, have satisfactory interactions with the
396

The people who are positioned to assert their interpretive will are generally those with considerable
other indicia of privilege. See, e.g., Sabrina Lyon & Lorne Sossin, “Data and Diversity in the Canadian
Justice Community” (2014) 10:5 Osgoode Legal Studies Research Paper No 12/2014.
397
Of Grammatology, supra note 28 at 73.
398
Ultimately, much of this argument is about the unconscious points where we impose something upon a
text. This is eloquently described in Herman Melville, Moby-Dick; or, The Whale (New York: Penguin
Books, 2002) at 213: “every stately or lovely emblazoning—the sweet tinges of sunset skies and woods …
all these are but subtle deceits, not actually inherent in substances, but only laid on from without.”

121

administrative state—we are just far less likely to read about them. When interpretations
clash, however, any legal system will dictate a final site of adjudication. The result can be
a slow climb up the courtroom hierarchy, the operation of undisguised force, or virtually
anything in between.399 In any case, it is this final word that sets legal linguistic meaning
rather than something inherent and universal within the (broadly construed) text. This is
perhaps the most frustrating aspect of the modern principle and its constituent rhetoric:
Legal interpretation is always already a matter of imposing a single authoritative
perspective; it hardly seems unreasonable to ask those who hold this power to be honest
about it.400 While judges are acting exactly as the nature of interpretation requires—that
is, they subordinate alternative perspectives by forging a single legal definition, backed
by state force—they prefer to soften this governmental necessity in the aforementioned
ways. At the Supreme Court, interpretation is derived from transcendent principles,
spoken in a variety of voices, and is, ultimately, ‘correct.’ None of these ideas are
possible in light of contemporary understandings of language, but they certainly sound
better than my suggested alternatives.401
Since some comfort might be derived from an interpretive regime that masks its
violence, it is important to be precise about my criticisms. If the current approach stands
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as the inevitable outcome of unverifiable sign associations, then what is harmed by
judges doing just that? The answer lies in the cost of this misdirection. Our current
regime is, as an early author of propaganda puts it, “the dramatization of important
issues.”402 When judges hide their interpretive perspective behind a quotation from Elmer
Driedger, interested parties are left with no sense of how the definitional work was
performed. This is an unnecessary and damaging point of unrestrained discretion.403
Statutory interpretation requires the decision-maker to reach for a variety of external
reference points, including the relevant provision and the parties’ readings of the same.
This process is radically subjective. Whoever defines the text will internalize the relevant
stimuli and impose a textual association that has no inherent connection to the original
signifiers.404 While the work being done to forge a definition cannot be structured or
communally verified—and the ensuing meaning cannot be right or wrong—the materials
from which we work can be apprehended, at least in a qualified sense. The current
approach has an unchangeable result (the imposition of a single, subjective perspective)
but a flawed process. I do not mean to invoke some tenuous distinction between process
and result but rather to ask two simple questions: What can be learned from an
interpretive judgment, and why does it matter? This quickly becomes a question of
knowledge and its limits.
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(a.) Belief in Doubt
The possibility of better interpretive practices depends on the potential utility of
transparent reasoning. An obvious problem in most calls for reform is at the root of my
critique: Nothing is outside the text, so hermeneutical “candour,” to use Hutchinson’s
term, simply creates more texts.405 We find signs reflecting signs, awash in embodied
contingency. As even Hart notes, there is nothing stable about the rules we use to
construe language, and this holds, too, for the explanations we offer. 406 Statutory
interpretation is the practice of talking about words, and it is uncertain whether there is a
meaningful difference between reading hermeneutical decisions or just reading the
definitional result. Deconstruction points out the violence of interpretive truth claims, but
leaves the conceptual field bare.407 Fortunately, there is a sense that this act of clearing
space points forward to some possibility of improvement. Confronting the pervasive
textual uncertainty that characterizes this discipline, along with experience itself, is “not
simply part of a ‘linguistic turn’ but instead serves as a material force to undo the
stagnation of institutions that hold us prisoners in the name of sophisticated forms of
pessimism.” 408 In other words, this critical lens embodies significant reformative
potential in its incredulity toward received institutional wisdom, but stops short of
nihilistic pessimism through an engagement with epistemological limits that always
imply something beyond themselves.409
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Interpretation is solitary work, but can there be a communal appreciation of how
that work is done? On this point, Wittgenstein’s posthumous notes provide important
insight. He advances a qualified epistemology, one where “doubts form a system,” and
within this system we find argumentation and judgment.410 Doubt and belief are not
mutually exclusive oppositions, but rather imply each other in a liminal relationship. In
practice, this becomes an awareness that
[a]ll testing, all confirmation and disconfirmation of a hypothesis takes
place already within a system. And this system is not a more or less
arbitrary and doubtful point of departure for all our arguments: no, it
belongs to the essence of what we call an argument. The system is not so
much the point of departure, as the element in which arguments have their
life.411
This is evocative of his better known work on our collective “language game,” but retains
an important distinction. Our embodied experiences are all we have—and this is not a
design flaw. Instead, he submits, “[i]f you tried to doubt everything you would not get as
far as doubting anything. The game of doubting itself presupposes certainty.”412 Even the
most profound skepticism requires some kind of provisional anchor, reminiscent of the
Cartesian approach.413 For interpretive purposes, this requires a consideration of how
readers experience the system, or the “language game,” of construing meaning in
administrative law.
Conceptualizing space for readers in relation to legal interpretation is important
for assessing the impact of analytical transparency. It also returns us to Dworkinian
skepticism through the invocation of structure. Indeed, the idea that doubt presupposes
410
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some foundational belief is broadly congruous with a “global internal skepticism.” 414
Recall, for instance, that much of the relevant discussion in Law’s Empire is about
recasting the external skeptic’s arguments to force the articulation of a positive stance.415
Administrative law presents a significant challenge this way because experiences of
state/subject interaction are profoundly (and increasingly) diverse. There is no single
experience of bureaucratic regulation.416 What, then, is the foundation from which we
express doubt about the interpretive enterprise? A provisional answer lies in the
collapsed, mutually informing version of internalized external skepticism discussed
above.417 I can identify a doctrinal structure in place for interpretation while remaining
mindful that it is contingent both in my perception of it and in its own existence as the
culmination of more or less arbitrary forces.418 There is general agreement, at least at the
level of terminology, that textual laws are interpreted by agencies and judges, and that
these institutions embody some aspirational content in terms of their interactions.
This description is also a text, but with an important caveat—there is more of it.
While that might seem like a strange distinction, and certainly there can be damaging
uses of volume where layers of misdirection must be peeled away, it helps explain a
problem with the most extreme skepticism. When we talk about statutory interpretation,
414
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there appears to be a rough consensus on the legal actors involved, the rhetorical steps
they take, and even on the most common normative goals of such an approach.419 My
legal area of focus is, on some readings, nothing more than an empty signifier, and, in the
absence of a metalanguage, I have no idea whether we mean the same thing when we talk
about ‘statutory interpretation.’ That uncertainty is useful to a point—it is the external
part of my preferred skepticism—but it does not explain the consistency of focus in the
relevant scholarship. 420 The difference is that ‘statutory interpretation’ implicates a
variety of other accessible texts. One can see or else read about lawmaking processes and
the legislative and constitutional sources for interpretive authority. None of these
constituent parts of construing statutory meaning transcend the need for embodied
interpretation, but when a common set of signifiers is articulated, there is an everwidening field of discourse, analogous to Adorno’s idea of the constellation.421 There is
some (intuitive) benefit to a decision that explains its bases for imposing a single
definitional perspective, but it is important to understand why.
If the law of interpretation is vacuous rhetoric that masks the play(s) of power in
the administrative state, the first step of reform seems simple: Replace misdirection with
transparent engagement into what can and cannot be known. This argument is concisely
set out in Hutchinson’s recent text—judges are decidedly “not godly figures” and, so,
“[t]hey have no especial, let alone divine insight into the meaning of legal texts or the
419
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nature of social justice.”422 As a result, “[t]he only real choice is one of candour or
subterfuge.”423 Yet this candour, however appealing, runs into the same problems at one
degree of separation. Generously reading Rizzo Shoes, for instance, one might note the
identification of an interpretive problem—at the beginning of the case, we do not know
what “bankruptcy” means.424 It should be helpful, then, to learn that the Court relies on,
say, the Interpretation Act to ground the analysis in remedial objectives.425 When the
purpose is subsequently located in workers’ interests upon the dissolution of
employment, it appears sensible for “bankruptcy” to be construed broadly through the
lens of labour rights.426 Still, even on this streamlined reading that omits the misdirection
of the modern principle, one wonders how these moves are more stable than the firstorder question of meaning. Remedial purposes must be interpreted in the same prisonhouse of language as bankruptcy, or “large and liberal construction,” or anything else.
Since definitions must always be imposed, and our laws will always require definitions,
is there any value to transparent reasoning, or do additional sites of interpretive work
simply create more opportunities for masking the unilateral assignation of meaning?
Returning, then, to the idea of constellations, it is useful to reconsider the status of
context in relation to the object of inquiry. If everything that surrounds the interpretive
question is a sign reflecting only other signs, interpretive candour has limited utility. The
distinction between first-order definitional questions and the work that surrounds them is
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a subtle one, but one that inheres to the nature of interpretation. When the reading subject
forges meaning,
the thing’s own “identity against its identifications” can never be grasped
in its immediacy … [so] we can only approach the object through a
constellation of concepts which attempts to bring into the light the specific
aspects of the object left out of the classifying process. The constellation
does not pretend to totality in the sense of fully expressing the sedimented
potential of the object. What it does is unleash the fullest possible
perspective on what the object has come to be in its particular context. …
“Context” here is understood not merely as external relation but also as the
internalized characteristics which make an object what it is. The
“substance” of the object is relational at the core.427
Totalizing claims are rejected in favour of a relational emphasis. This is definition by
absence, an effort to triangulate meaning based on a necessarily embodied perspective.
While that likely sounds opaque, these are familiar steps in many hermeneutical
processes.428 Readers of poetry, for instance, will recognize the liminal character of
interpreting though constellations.429 This is a process of “creating a place for possibility
and present absences.”430 A foundation for doubt (which implies something that can be
known) lies in this appreciation of signifying potential. It requires careful engagement
with the connections that inform our embodied experiences of a text and an openness to
the contingency of the same.
It would be deeply hypocritical to assert that some amorphous ideal of
connectedness can inform interpretive methodology after my critique of so-called
structuring principles. This arbitrary signifier is meant instead to introduce a multitude of
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others. A fundamental problem with legal interpretation is its faith in language’s ability to
answer its own challenges. We can advance words ad infinitum, but none have any
greater claim to communicability than the first-order term or provision at issue.
Embracing the relational context of Adorno’s constellations is not about linguistic
transcendence but rather closing in on the core of what cannot be known. In response,
interpreters can avail themselves of a pragmatism that refrains “from thinking that there is
a special set of terms in which all contributions to the conversation should be put.”431
There is nothing special about the language game of statutory interpretation, and that
provides a helpful means of looking beyond entrenched signifiers that exclude alternative
perspectives, even at the level of analytical work. Instead, one becomes “willing to pick
up the jargon of the interlocutor rather than translating it into one’s own.”432 The goal of
such an epistemology is “to find the maximum amount of common ground with others”
toward a version of hermeneutics “where we do not understand what is happening but are
honest enough to admit it.”433 This provides a new lens through which to consider the
value of interpretive candour.
None of the foregoing terms mean anything definite, and that is exactly the point
they try to signify. There is no “constellation” out there as distilled method; rather, its
meaning (at least to me) is that it means a variety of things, as a non-sedimented signifier,
depending on the site of interpretation and the position of the reading subject. When we
open space for non-traditional interpretive voices and considerations, the ensuing regime
of hermeneutics is one of doubt based on a simple belief in the contingency and
431
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subjectivity of language.434 In practice, this becomes candour about the violence of
interpretation—not the simple transparency of saying, as the Rizzo Shoes case does, we
“rely upon s. 10 of the Interpretation Act.”435 The rhetoric of the modern principle
distracts from a necessary feature of democratic legal interpretations, that “one cannot
take seriously the existence of a plurality of legitimate values without recognizing that
they will conflict. And this conflict cannot be visualized merely in terms of competing
interests that could be adjudicated or accommodated without any form of violence.”436
An inevitable, uncomfortable result of vesting someone with the last interpretive word is
this ascendancy of one perspective over all others. Pragmatism insists that this work can
be carried out alongside an acknowledgement that “our democratic and liberal principles
define only one possible language game among others.”437 This returns us to the profound
contingency of the administrative state and hints toward a central place for hermeneutical
reasoning.
Transparent engagement with the violence of interpretation is useful in spite of its
empty signifiers. The language game itself is unimportant, except insofar as it provides a
shared set of raw materials through which subjects approach definitional work. A
pragmatic approach to hermeneutics infuses doubt into lofty epistemic claims, and this
doubt (which is built on the structure of belief identified by Wittgenstein) becomes a
significant analytical device.438 This becomes a question of focalization; interpretive
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candour is most useful when it identifies a range of epistemic problems. While nothing
preempts the text or the necessity of reading it, legal interpretation is ultimately a matter
of forging a single definition with the threat of state force. If the interpreter is honest
about the “present absences” that characterize this process, she expresses both belief and
doubt within a range of “not-knowing.”439 In other words, despite the radical subjectivity
of language, there are more and less incommunicable signs. We appear to reach
functional communication more quickly when we say “chair” as opposed to “the
principles of fundamental justice.” Within an unknowable, contingent field of language,
some things remain more stable than others.
This returns us to the idea of context and volume. Interpretation mandates a
certain number of presumptions, but these need not be arbitrary. Drawing, once more, on
Rizzo Shoes as a familiar example, readers find a range of epistemic challenges. There is
nothing stable about the invocation of statutory interpretation as a doctrinal lens—just as
there is nothing determinate about relying on the “large and liberal” stipulation in the
Interpretation Act—but the former provides a host of signifiers that become an accessible
constellation.440 While no inherent content hews to the accepted terms of this practice, a
language of engagement and critique exists within the tradition of statutory interpretation.
Armed with treatises and readable institutional practices, one can argue that, for instance,
a given definition seems to transgress its commitment to purposive interpretation as
rendered in a lengthy Parliamentary debate. This will not be right or wrong in any
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transcendent sense, but provides an instructive contrast to something like the “ordinary
and grammatical sense.”
If we talk about interpretation in terms of applying legislative instruments, there is
a considerable field of signification that is potentially open to alternative perspectives.
Conversely, the current approach preempts these structures for doubt in a common
language game. We can argue about, say, what purpose is embodied in a Hansard debate;
we cannot argue about the ‘ordinary grammar.’ This is because the former respects
difference—the notion that our individual understanding of the text will be informed by
psycholinguistic experiences—while providing a set of signifiers for the expression of
alternative perspectives. 441 This is significantly different from my assertion that an
interpretation is or is not “ordinary.” The extent to which interpretive candour avails itself
of a democratic language game is important. There is nothing productive about judicial
transparency regarding the use of a “large and liberal” lens, or considering the “entire
context.” Instead, to use the former as an example, a pragmatic approach would insist on
bringing that idea into the accepted discursive field. A decision-maker relying on that
provision in the Interpretation Act would accordingly articulate a commitment to
purposive reading that tries to get beyond narrow technicalities. Again, none of these
words signify beyond individuals, but they present as sites for conflict. When I express a
definition in terms of, say, an expansive purpose that endeavours to give as much space
for governmental objectives as possible, there is an implicit limit that implies the other.
We cannot know any universal ‘purpose,’ but candour is useful when it advances such a
concept in a manner that invites disagreement. One cannot speak openly about (inter alia)
441
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purpose and usage without creating space for alternative perspectives within the shared
language game of legal interpretation.
(b.) Candid Bureaucracy
The language game of administrative law is uniquely positioned to accommodate
difference in the interpretive process. While its constituent terms like deference and
dialogue are often vacuous rhetorical devices meant to disguise the imposition of judicial
force, this is still an area where “legitimate techniques for agency statutory interpretation
diverge sharply from the legitimate techniques and standards for judicial statutory
interpretation.”442 Indeed, the presence of an irresolvable “paradox of deference” evokes
a latent compatibility with the play of language and problems of signification. If the
administrative state takes its own (stated) commitments seriously, then the ubiquitous
“range” of possible definitions embodies significant promise. As bureaucratic governance
continues to forge new, diverse spaces for interpretive work, it becomes necessary to
refocus the status of institutional difference. There can be no hierarchy of reasonable
answers to interpretive questions when “[s]ubjectivity is limited by the vision of the
subject, and the task … is to do the best with what you have.”443 Of course, the “best”
answer faces the same internal limits—that of embodied subjecthood—but its search
remains “a vocation no less essential for being impossible.”444 An interpretive candour
that embraces the failure of finding the best answers is deeply compatible with an
administrative state that disperses authority to diverse actors in hopes of learning from
alternative perspectives via specialization and deference.
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Candid bureaucracy is, in other words, uniquely imaginable within this legal
matrix of respect for institutional difference and the “paradox of deference.” It is
important, however, to note the dangers that inhere to calls for progress. First, the very
idea of progress is a metanarrative closely related to naturalization.445 Reformative efforts
should therefore retain a degree of external skepticism: Advocates are in no better
position to speak beyond themselves, and the language game from which we speak is
historically contingent, reflecting innumerable presumptions and biases that have
generally favoured those with conventional indicia of privilege. 446 Secondly, the
temptation to valorize lofty ideals must be resisted at every turn. Demanding an
interpretive regime that, say, ‘reads for difference’ is, without more, a deferral of the
first-order question. This is especially important in administrative law because many of
the loftiest terms in the jurisprudence signify, at least to me, as promising areas of
reformative potential. The stated commitments in this area embody a distinct
compatibility with my critique of language, but only where they exist within a larger
constellation that includes enough context for critique within our shared language game.
To this end, it is worthwhile to consider the foundational point that “agencies are
not inferior courts. They are part of the Executive branch.”447 These are ever-diversifying
sites of regulation; the power to construe language is delegated to tribunals in an effort to
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gain something from institutional difference and alternative positioning. Interpretation is
always already inflected in bureaucracy because, as Gilles Deleuze puts it in his reading
of the Recherche, “[v]ocation is always predestination with regard to signs. Everything
that teaches us something emits signs; every act of learning is an interpretation.”448
Placing this in conversation with the non-hierarchical image of agencies as executive
expressions of power, we begin to find space for definitional work that approaches the
language game from a different perspective.449 Without the rhetorical misdirection of
principled restraint, administrative law becomes a regime where “discretion is piled on
top of discretion—judicial discretion on top of official discretion.”450 Given the violence
of imposing linguistic sense, whoever has the last interpretive word enjoys unilateral
power. The structure of discretion is decidedly top-heavy. While there is little chance of
transcending the problems of language, the relevant jurisprudence is unequivocal about
its commitment to the “paradox of deference”—or, more specifically, the possibility of
multiple legitimate answers. The question is how to review for that “range” of
permissible difference without descending into judicial supremacy.451
Statutory interpretation pushes these commitments to an extreme because it can
never be reliably constrained. It is undeniably frightening to vest state actors with the
ability to impose their definitional will, which is perhaps why even a critic as judicially
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effacing as Vermeule supports some measure of available review.452 The official position
is that judges police the outer limits of administrative authority, but few acknowledge the
radical implications brought about by the valorization of deference. 453 Self-enclosed
governance posits a “totality” where the reasonableness of an unverifiable sign
association will be assessed from the bench. As a result, it is “always seeking to
incorporate the Other within itself under the category of the same.” 454 Institutional
difference provides an answer here, but not one that is compatible with the jurisprudential
treatment of (convenient) expertise. 455 Although administrative law is uniquely
positioned to legitimize non-judicial definitions while expressly disagreeing with them,
this is functionally useless if specialization is presented as a means of discovering a
correct definition.
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(post)modernity, but one that be accommodated within the language game of the
administrative state.
Agency specialization is often lauded without a precise definition, especially as it
relates to the interpretive project. This owes in large part to orthodox efforts “to define a
stable and uniquely legal subject matter.”457 Concerns with the distributive impacts of a
given regulatory regime are implicitly viewed as paralegal; agencies gesture toward
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found meaning in statutes as opposed to “straightforward political disputation.”458 While
there are compelling arguments for candour at the level of policy—essentially that these
always already inform a statutory reading—this does not allow us to escape the prisonhouse of language. How can anyone speak beyond themselves about the impacts of a
legislative scheme, particularly where these are often inextricably bound up in alternative
experiences and the absence of the most vulnerable?459 That is, of course, an impossible
task, but one that is uniquely consonant with an aspirational view of administrative
governance. We are ultimately faced again with the question of context within the
language game of bureaucracy. The current approach is problematic because its
“[d]escriptive language is often either useless—because it adds nothing but a conclusory
label to a conclusion reached on other grounds—or downright dangerous—because it
hides the norms guiding judges—or both.”460 Greater transparency at the level of policy
expertise—which is uniquely legitimate in administrative doctrine—is promising to the
extent that this knowledge is placed within constellations that function as sites of
disagreement in our shared language game.
With its self-conscious “range” of definitions and ability to legitimize
incongruous answers from various institutions, administrative law is well-positioned for
this type of candour. Its actualization, though, depends on legal actors’ willingness to
458
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reject “a peculiarly deceptive kind of rhetoric [that] attempts to combine-yet-separate
subjectivity and objectivity.”461 The objective register is familiar to readers of law, and it
roughly traces the contours of Dworkin’s anti-positivism. This is useful to a point: As we
are reminded throughout his corpus, everyone must take a position on the best answer to
an interpretive question. What is typically missing, though, is that which is explicitly
denounced in Law’s Empire: external doubt. There is nothing natural about the process of
statutory interpretation; from the delegated power to our concern with purposive reading,
innumerable presumptions and historical contingencies are presented without much metaengagement. 462 This is not to say that reading for what a democratically elected
legislature intended is necessarily flawed, but rather to insist that these moves are
positioned as areas of contention within a shared language game. A ubiquitous signifier
like ‘purpose’ can then be understood in relation to, inter alia, institutional roles,
processes of lawmaking, and theories of signification.463 Administrative law in particular
can render these interpretive methods as points in their unique institutional constellation,
thus giving way to a positive expression of meaning that presents its premises as
contingent and rebuttable.
When interpretation is conceptualized as the unilateral ascendancy of an elite
perspective, claims to democratic participation are necessarily qualified. Someone must
have the final word, and that person generally benefits from a substantial amount of
privilege. This is where bureaucratic regulation embodies the most significant potential;
461
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the judiciary remains atop the interpretive hierarchy, but the administrative state depends
on diverse sites of interpretation that impose additional considerations in the relevant
language game. Processes of administration are inherently normative, though, and the
current regime reinforces pre-existing distributions of power through “forms of pervasive
social inequality that are ultimately backed up by the threat of physical harm.”464 In other
words, despite the promise of interpretive decentralization, bureaucracy often reflects the
prevailing order.465 This is symptomatic of an interpretive violence that denies itself.
When dominant metanarratives like ‘rationality’ or ‘efficiency’ are proffered outside their
(inherently political) constellation, they underwrite definitions that valorize the status
quo. Fortunately, just as there is nothing inevitable about how these words signify, there
is nothing preordained about this approach that relegates difference to the margins.
(c.) Interpretive Poetics
When we talk about interpretation, we talk about language. These words, in turn,
require interpretation and, in the non-legal, everyday sphere, that interpretation is largely
unconscious. I hear you speak and process that text in accordance with how I understand
language and that to which it refers. Often, this seems unproblematic. While
conversations rarely involve the sort of rhetorical misdirection that characterizes the
modern principle, they also tend to presume communicative clarity, or at least its
possibility. 466 Is it possible, then, that by theorizing at length about statutory
interpretation, we miss its intuitive character? The signifier for ‘ordinary’ embodies no
464
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inherent content, but we all seem to bring a default (albeit personalized) ordinariness into
routine interpretive work. In my experience, one rarely breaks out Saussure’s Course in
General Linguistics to lament the hermeneutical drift of a conversational reference to
foliage.467 The question of how to square the sense of shared meaning that typically
accompanies routine interpretation with the profound contingency of our signs (coupled
with the lack of a metalanguage) does not produce an immediate answer. There is
compelling reason to understand our (post)modernity in terms of a manufactured
certainty—one that disguises the ways in which meaning is constructed and then
naturalized by those in power—and yet this fails to account for my faith in the
comprehensibility of this sentence. Meaning is forever “bracketed” by that which cannot
be known; still, we continue to write as though understood.468
In a recent defence of his craft, Ben Lerner makes a pertinent observation about
poetry and how it “becomes a word for an outside that poems cannot bring about, but can
make felt, albeit as an absence.”469 Is it any wonder, he asks, that so many dislike it?
Poets are artists of failure, writing toward a core that cannot be written—approaching
something like the Romantic sublime, and perhaps getting ever-closer, but never
arriving.470 Amidst this general disfavour, there is cause for celebration because, if poetry
is about the inexpressible, then it stands as a qualified success each time someone writes
around that which cannot be spoken and brings it forward through a keenly felt absence.
When we (appear to) reach communicative congress, it is worth considering the
467
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respective roles of both speech and silence. Conceptual gaps are often as important as
spoken ideas; in law, for instance, we (appear to) understand statutory interpretation
through both its stated aims and that which is centred on but unspoken. The absence of,
say, strictly utilitarian considerations (e.g., what a given definition of bankruptcy would
have meant for the now-defunct Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes) informs our dialogue about this
practice. It is taken, at a high level of generality, as an exercise that inquires closely into a
written provision. This is not to suggest that is any more natural than any other signifier,
but rather to signal the ways in which we unconsciously listen for spaces when we
communicate.
Of course, much of the process of construing routine communications relies on
the source of speech. This has become a major preoccupation is the deconstructive
literature that inquires into manufactured power relations. It has been argued, for
instance, that “[t]he context affects the understanding of a message in such a way that
communication itself becomes jeopardized, since the form of interaction (the medium)
changes the content, or perverts the understanding of the content.”471 We understand
language largely through relational context.472 The perceived source of a text affects our
interpretive expectations and provides the stimulus for our constructions of meaning.473
As such, legal interpretation imports—and even begins with—a familiar web of
signifiers. None of these have inherent value, but it is hardly difficult to isolate common
themes in the relevant jurisprudence. Parliament speaks, decision-makers interpret, and
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interested readers engage with the aforementioned metanarratives (legislative intent,
ordinary meaning, etc.). Much of my argument to this point has been about this
disingenuous process of talking around the definitional question, but signification by
absence (or, perhaps more precisely, by triangulation) is arguably our sole means of
communication in a world of unverifiable sign associations. The possibility of progress
therefore depends on greater attention to the language game of interpretation. In the
absence of a metalanguage, we cannot talk sensibly about what a word means, but must
look instead at the language we use to surround meaning.
Opening spaces for otherness in statutory interpretation requires careful attention
to sites of conflict. If privileged legal actors hinge their reasoning on individualized
understandings of what a word means or what Parliament intends, then interpretation is a
proxy for power. In the absence of a metalanguage, those heuristics reflect entrenched
bias; ‘ordinariness’ quickly gives way to domination when decision-makers are those
already in positions of authority. In contrast, the pragmatic approach views something
like ‘ordinary meaning’ as conceptually identical to the first-order definitional question.
Both require a constellation of signs to provide potential sources of content. Put another
way, when we talk about, say, the ordinary meaning of a word, we evoke innumerable
unstated presumptions. We are talking about ourselves, drawing on experiential baggage,
and are invariably influenced by our biases—both consciously and otherwise. Although
speaking outside of our own ideology is impossible—and no one rises above the fray into
disembodied neutrality—the interpretive process can better reflect the areas of difference
that militate one way or another based on psycholinguistics.
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An example of this is found in the relatively recent decision of British Columbia
Human Rights Tribunal v. Schrenk. 474 The issue was simple: Does human rights
protection “regarding employment” extend to discrimination by a colleague? While the
analysis relies on familiar counterproductive tropes, the steady expansion of signifiers is
instructive. One central legislative directive here was “person.” It was held that,
[i]n its ordinary meaning, the term “person” generally refers to a human
being. In the context of the Code, it also defines the class of actors against
whom the prohibition in s. 13(1)(b) applies. The ordinary meaning of
“person” is broad; certainly, it encompasses a broader range of actors than
merely any person with economic authority over the complainant. It is
significant that the Legislature chose to prohibit employment
discrimination by any “person”. Had it intended only to prohibit
employment discrimination by employers – or some other narrow class of
individuals – it could easily have done so by using a narrower term than
“person”.475
Within this barrage of legalistic language, a pragmatic bent begins to emerge. We find the
classic repetitions of ‘ordinariness’ and suggestive legislative intent, but not without a
sense of contextualization. Although it is, to be sure, an underdeveloped and hardly
exemplary passage, the majority’s interest in what a “person” might include begins to setup sites of potential conflict. Questions about breadth, consequences, and omissions
provide points of engagement that are capable of accommodating different perspectives.
On the idea that “person” means something more general than “employer,” for
instance, the Court is introducing a preliminary step in the construction of meaning.476
One’s conclusion might differ from the majority here, and arguments can be made for a
contextual readings of “person” that include only employers, or everybody in the world,
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or some middle ground between the two. At the level of linguistic work, the important
point is not the conclusion but rather the opportunities for disagreement. Scope is one
point at which difference will manifest. Interpretive communication is advanced, rather
than obscured, when the necessarily contentious processes of construction are presented
around the word at issue. Again, those words mean exactly as much as any other symbol
in isolation, but advance the goals of democratic decision-making when presented within
a constellation that is mindful of not-knowing. The central question has no uniquely
reasonable answer, but a pragmatic approach insists on identifying that which surrounds
the first-order definition. Reading texts through the constellation that surrounds them reemphasizes the absence of transcendental signifiers, and this, in turn, changes the terms
of the interpretive inquiry. “Person,” without more, means nothing at all, but instead
stands as the sum of choices made at each site of definitional conflict.
None of this removes the reality of a last definitional word vested in the legal
elite. Their definitions will not become more universal. An important distinction, though,
concerns the impact of legal interpretation on those affected. As Robert Cover
demonstrated so eloquently more than thirty years ago, giving meaning to laws is not an
exclusively theoretical exercise. 477 Citizens demand—and should demand—better
interpretations despite the impossibility measuring that standard against an accessible
reality. As I have discussed at length above, the current regime imposes a dominant
worldview as definitional sense. We might, then, aspire to interpretive work that
considers marginalized voices and alternative perspectives. Of course, the persons
considering these voices would remain wealthy embodiments of sociolegal privilege—an
important problem that underscores the exclusionary classism of the whole enterprise—
477
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but, to the extent we work within a flawed system, it remains worthwhile to name the
flaws and their potential (albeit qualified) solutions.
The language that surrounds definitional questions can either facilitate or
foreclose engagement with otherness. Continuing with the Schrenk example, when one
considers the scope of “person” or “regarding employment,” there is a clear entry point
for disagreement. Even as the interpretation fixes a particular meaning—here, protection
is afforded against all workplace discrimination—there is potential for the expression of
difference. Something like “employment” is deeply contingent on one’s psycholinguistic
biases; it is as personally and culturally shaped as the ‘ordinary meaning,’ but refocuses
the inquiry. The status of these points in the constellation of not-knowing is the same as
their criteria: They do not assume the rationality or superiority of a single perspective. As
such, considering the alternatives to how “employment” means invites a far more
meaningful inquiry than the same question concerning ‘ordinary’ grammar. This does not
mean the words that form constellations will be more stable than any others; rather, their
utility arises out of the ensuing moves within the language game of pragmatic
interpretation. I do not know what “employment” signifies to anyone else, but associated
texts immediately suggest themselves on the interpretive question of scope. It becomes
far easier to be mindful of how my experiences (and privilege) influence my
understanding of the workplace when the question is “how far does ‘employment’
extend?” rather than “what is its ordinary meaning?” The ensuing definition still reflects
individualized choices about, for instance, how far the workplace extends, but presents an
analytical step that is transparently contingent on subjective value judgments.
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There are no easy answers in this area of the law. Meaningless signs must be
resolved with recourse to a final interpretive word. The foregoing pragmatic approach
simply provides one means of infusing doubt into the process. By articulating the
processes that inform a definition—without presenting those conclusions as a priori—the
veneer of inevitability is cast aside in favour of respect for difference. We can talk around
a word, making its meaning(s) felt by absence, when we inquire into the interpretive steps
that have previously taken place in the margins. The result is to ask what makes a
definition appear ‘ordinary’ to us; or, more specifically, how our experiences and biases
make us answer certain definitional questions without articulating them. As a result, no
interpretation is ordinary, and the expression of discrete steps eschews uncritical reliance
on one’s perspective as axiomatically correct or even reasonable. Such an approach
would stop asking Driedger’s questions; it would instead ask how and where we impose
meaning when language is in dispute.
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VI. Conclusion
Legal texts are inseparable from the subjects reading them and, so, the structuring
principles of statutory interpretation fail to constrain definitional agency. Under a system
of written laws, disputes must eventually be ‘settled’ with recourse to a single
authoritative perspective. A meaningless set of signs and signifiers cannot accommodate
a communal interpretation—though, if it could, that, too, would be unverifiable in the
absence of a metalanguage. We can only talk about language with more of the same,
continuing on ad infinitum. This prison-house of language encompasses both the firstorder questions we ask about linguistic meaning and the subsequent moves we make
toward a crystallized definition. There is nothing outside the text, and that includes our
means of reading it. State actors cannot acknowledge this (post)structural play without
conceding their suggestive notions of objectivity. As such, the administrative state—
which is, itself, a deeply contingent outcome of institutional practices—presents as
neutral and inevitable. The result is an increasingly complex matrix of interpretive voices,
all centred on the same dominant logic. This is not to say that governmental power can
manifest and communicate across institutions using the same vexed means of linguistic
expression; rather, those who speak definitional sense are always already in power. The
legal image of reality is that which perpetuates the current distribution of power.
The possibility of progress, then, is not a mere shift in doctrinal method. Even that
proposed shift would be unverifiable within our oversaturation of meaningless signs. It
might be some form of revolution—a wholesale repudiation of this epoch of governance,
with privileged decision-makers forging linguistic meaning with the force of law—but
such an approach risks clear impracticality. Working on the assumption that our
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constitutional structure will not be overthrown in the near future, the question is whether
meaningless signs can be interpreted in a way that is less violent in its disingenuous
marginalization. The first step, as I have attempted to show in my first chapter, is an
elucidation of the problem. Language does not facilitate the dominant approach to legal
interpretation. This is obscured behind empty rhetoric because it allows the dominant
picture of reality to appear as though impartial and natural—progressive, even. My
second and third chapters look to both the scholarship and case law to reorient the
discourse around that which has been disappeared: viz., who gets to speak when meaning
is in dispute? It is, at a high level of generality, those already within the privileged sphere
of the legal elite. Finally, I suggest that the problem can be part of the solution. The
epistemological problems of definitional sense can be positioned as sites of conflict and
otherness. When decision-makers engage with that which cannot be known, their
assertions become ‘I’ statements, necessarily implying a beyond to which they aspire.
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Appendix A: Case Sample Methodology & List
My third chapter canvases Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence after
Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick for the treatment of statutory interpretation on judicial
review. This sample is the product of a search in LexisNexis Quicklaw for decisions at
the Supreme Court level after March 7th, 2008. The terms are “administrative law” and
“statutory interpretation,” which returns the following cases. Irrelevant decisions that
appear in this search are included with a reason for omission in the line below. This list is
current to August 3rd, 2018.
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